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Abstract
We are experiencing a time in which advances in information technology change
everything around us. Almost every aspect of our work and life, from daily
travel to grocery shopping, is now or will soon be connected to the internet.
This drastic change has led to the emergence of many new products that display
network effects, meaning that individual consumers value a product more when
more other consumers use the same product. At the same time, development of
data storage/processing tools offers a great chance for many firms to collect large
amounts of data and understand their customers’ purchasing behavior. For these
firms, a significant challenge — as well as opportunity — is to develop models of
customer choice behavior that incorporate network effects and to use such models
to make better pricing decisions. This dissertation addresses the development and
analysis of some such models.
We consider a seller’s problem of determining revenue-maximizing prices for
an assortment of products that exhibit network effects. Customers make purchase
decisions according to a multinomial logit (MNL) choice model, modified — to
incorporate network effects — so that the utility each individual customer gains
from purchasing a particular product depends on the market’s total consumption
of that product. In the setting of homogeneous products, we show that if the
network effect is comparatively weak, then the optimal pricing decision of the
seller is to set identical prices for all products. However, if the network effect is
strong, then the optimal pricing decision is to set the price of one product low and
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to set the prices of all other products to a single high value. This pricing scheme
boosts the sales of the single low-price product in comparison to the sales of
all other products. The analysis is also extended to settings with heterogeneous
products, and we show that optimal solutions have a structure similar to that
found in the homogeneous case: either maintain a semblance of balance among
all products, or boost the sales of just one product. Based on this structure,
we propose an effective computational algorithm for such general heterogeneous
settings.
Subsequently, we study the preceding pricing problem from a robust
optimization perspective. Unlike the classical MNL model where products’ prices
and sales have a one-to-one correspondence, in the MNL model with network
effects a fixed set of prices may not uniquely determine sales. This occurs because,
for given prices, sales arise as the solution to an equilibrium condition. In some
cases, there may be multiple sales levels that satisfy the equilibrium condition.
Among those sales equilibria corresponding to a given set of prices, we call the
one with the highest revenue the “optimistic” equilibrium, and the one with the
lowest revenue the “pessimistic” equilibrium. In our initial study mentioned in
the previous paragraph, we implicitly took an “optimistic” approach. We next
take the pessimistic attitude and study the revenue-maximizing problem in the
pessimistic setting. In the case that there is only one product to sell, the problem
has the same pessimistic optimal price as the optimistic one, when the network
effect is relatively weak. However, when the network effect is strong, the optimal
policy requires the seller to become more conservative and the pessimistic optimal
price is lower than the optimistic one. In the case that there are two products,
v
the structure of equations at equilibrium becomes more complicated and we are
not able to derive an analytical solution. To numerically solve this problem, two
directions for finding the pessimistic optimal solution are proposed: divide and
search, and linear relaxation. In addition, our numerical studies show that when
the network effect is strong, the revenue from offering exactly one product is almost
as good as that from selling an assortment of multiple products. This suggests
that a company selling multiple products with strong network effects may be wise
to simply offer just one product.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Revenue Management (RM) practices in the airline industry originated largely in
response to the Airline Deregulation Act in 1978. With this Act, the U.S. Civil
Aviation Board (CAB) relaxed its control of airline prices and schedules, and
therefore gave airline carriers unprecedented freedom to make their own pricing
decisions. Since then, all carriers, ranging from long-established legacy carriers to
new low-cost startups, have been actively developing new selling and marketing
strategies, in hope to entice more customers and bring in higher revenues. At
the same time, advances in information technology have enabled carriers to track
and manage demands and sales, it further encouraging them to build new revenue
management systems.
The central idea of revenue management is to sell the right product for the
right price to the right customer at the right time, with the goal to maximize
the total revenue. In the airline industry, the primary controllable decisions are
prices, products, and inventory. On a single flight, it seems that any two seats in
the same cabin have almost the same value for a customer. However, by imposing
1
2various purchase restrictions, cancellation policies and length of stay requirements,
a carrier is able to essentially create ticket products with different values from the
same resource. These differentiated products are labeled as different fare classes
in the airline industry. Furthermore, even if product characteristics and prices are
determined on a flight, the carrier has the flexibility to control the availability of
each product at any time by adjusting their inventories.
In practice, there are two main aspects of revenue management: forecasting
and optimization. In the forecasting stage, the work involves collecting data
on customers’ behavior (e.g., purchases) and using that data to predict future
demand, or more generally, future responses by customers to carriers’ decisions. In
the optimization stage, RM practitioners need to determine the pricing decisions
and inventory levels to maximize the total revenue. An excellent implementation
of RM requires integration of both aspects. In addition to the airline industry,
many other industries are taking the power of RM and applying it to their
businesses, including hotels, retailing, car rentals, cruise lines, etc.
The success of implementing RM in a business depends on understanding
consumer behavior and building a model that reflects reality. One of the earliest
models in capacity control for a single-leg problem was proposed by Littlewood
(1972). This two-fare-class problem can be elegantly solved by an explicit
expression of the protection levels for the high-fare class. The key idea is,
when remaining inventory drops to the optimal protection level, revenue from
selling one seat to a certain low-fare request is equivalent to that of reserving
that seat for a potential high-fare request. Although the multi-fare-class version
of this problem has no explicit optimal solution, Belobaba (1987a, b) used
3the same idea and designed two simple but effective heuristics (EMSR-a and
EMSR-b) that are still widely used in business. Inspired by this classical model,
much research has focused on variations and extensions of this model. Some
examples include Brumelle and McGill (1993), Wollmer (1992), Robinson (1995)
and van Ryzin and McGill (2000).
“All models are wrong but some are useful.” This famous quote by statistician
George E. P. Box has been mentioned in several OR/MS works, for example
Besbes and Zeevi (2015). Inevitably, it also applies to the Littlewood model
as well as most of its extensions. The classical model makes an oversimplified
assumption that consumer demands for each fare-class are independent of each
other and also independent of the controls being applied on them. In addition, it
assumes that low-fare customers always arrive first and high-fare customers arrive
later. This assumption may not hold in reality, especially today when product
price and information are largely transparent to customers over the internet
selling channel. Buy-up (switching to a high-fare when a low-fare is unavailable)
and buy-down (substituting a low-fare for a high-fare when discounts are open)
effects have attracted research attention and there is much work focusing on this
direction. Please see Brumelle et al. (1990), Belobaba and Hopperstad (1999),
Cooper et al. (2006), and Cooper and Li (2012).
To address the oversimplification in early models, Talluri and van Ryzin
(1994) applied the multinomial logit (MNL) choice model to the realm of revenue
management. The MNL model was proposed and formulated by McFadden
(1974) and has been actively studied and implemented in many areas including
economics, operations research, marketing, etc. It derives from an underlying
4random utility model, in which each individual customer has a random utility for
each product. In the model, consumer choice behavior is explicitly represented
with a purchasing probability for each product, which depends on all the
available products. Talluri and van Ryzin took up this model to study the
single-leg multi-fare problem, and showed that it can directly address the issue
of independent demand over substitutable products. Based on the MNL model,
they further found a surprisingly simple structure for the optimal solution to the
assortment optimization problem.
Despite the MNL model’s many advantages in modeling multi-product
consumer choice behavior, there still exist some restrictions for its own. One
of these restrictions is the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) property.
According to the model, the ratio of any two alternatives contained in the available
set remains unchanged whenever a new alternative is added. A classical example
to demonstrate IIA is the well-known red-bus/blue-bus paradox. Because of this,
IIA is often considered one of the most unfavorable properties for the MNL model.
There have been many studies of multi-product pricing problems in which
customer choices are governed by the MNL model or variations thereof. One
of the central conclusions that emerges from this work is that if consumer price
sensitivities are identical across products, then an optimal pricing strategy involves
a constant markup for all products; that is, it is optimal to set prices so that
the difference between a product’s price and its unit cost is the same for all
products. This result was first obtained by Anderson and de Palma (1992). In
the interim, a number of alternative proofs and extensions have appeared. For
a summary of this work, we refer to the literature review provided in the paper
5by Gallego and Wang (2014). Early research on computational approaches for
MNL pricing problems includes that of Hanson and Martin (1996), who show
that in such problems the objective function (total revenue) is not a concave
function of the vector of prices. Subsequent work has established, however, that
if the problem is re-formulated with the vector of sales quantities as the decision
variable, then the objective function is, in fact, concave and thus the problem can
be solved efficiently; see Xue and Song (2007), Dong et al. (2009), and Li and Huh
(2011). One notable computational approach for MNL pricing problems involves
a reduction of the multivariate optimization problem to a suitable single-variable
optimization problem that can be solved with a one-dimensional search.
In this dissertation, we study a multi-product pricing optimization problem
based on the MNL model. However, we are particularly interested in a group of
products with network effects. A product exhibits network effects if individual
consumers value it more when more other consumers purchase it. The idea of
network effects originated from telephone service, see Katz and Shapiro (1986).
The more people who join a telephone network, the more people each individual
user in the network could have contact with, therefore the more valuable this
telephone network is to each user. Online social platforms, such as Facebook
and Twitter, may be viewed as modern versions of telephone networks. As we
have been increasingly relying on the internet for everything in our work and
life, the world has seen the development and success of many other products or
services with network effects, including computer software, online video games,
and app-based ride sharing services.
There are already many works focusing on products with network effects, and
6most of them can be divided into two categories. One category addresses products
with global network effects, whereby a customer’s utility for a product depends on
the total consumption of the product in question. The other addresses products
with local network effects, whereby a consumer gains utility if his/her “neighbors”
purchase the same product. A common starting point in studies involving local
network effects is a graph of social connections. We refer to Candogan et al.
(2012), Bloch and Que´rou (2012), and references therein for studies of local
network effects. In this dissertation, we consider only global network effects.
The study of global network effects has a long history in the economics literature.
For reviews, we refer to Farrell and Saloner (1985), Katz and Shapiro (1985), and
Economides (1996a). The MNL model with network effects that serves as the
input to our pricing optimization problem has been considered in previous studies
by Anderson et al. (1992), Brock and Durlauf (2002), and Starkweather (2003).
Anderson et al. (1992, Section 7.8) considers an oligopoly in which each firm sets
the price of its own single product, and market shares are determined by the MNL
model with network effects. The questions, conclusions, and methodology in this
dissertation are quite distinct from those of Anderson et al.
This dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 studies a seller’s problem
of determining revenue-maximizing prices for an assortment of products that
exhibit network effects. Customers make purchase decisions according to a
multinomial logit choice model, modified — to incorporate network effects —
so that the utility each individual customer gains from purchasing a particular
product depends on the market’s total consumption of that product. The content
of this chapter appeared in Du et al. (2016). Chapter 3 continues to address the
7same problem from a different perspective. The introduction of network effects
into the MNL model causes a result that a fixed pricing decision may have multiple
sales quantities in equilibrium. Put differently, the sales may not be uniquely
determined by the price, even in a deterministic model. This poses an important
question to the seller — which equilibrium to expect in face of multiple equilibria.
To address this issue and to guard the seller against poor outcomes, we study the
optimal pricing problem from a “pessimistic” perspective, wherein it is assumed
that for a given pricing decision, the worst possible sales level (from the seller’s
perspective) arises. Chapter 4 summarizes this dissertation and points to several
future research directions.
Chapter 2
Optimal Pricing for a
Multinomial Logit Choice Model
2.1 Introduction
A product is said to exhibit network effects if individual consumers value it more
when more other consumers purchase it. For example, video game industry has
never been such booming like today and the most popular games fall into the
category of multi-player online games. In these games, each individual player must
interact with other players to finish a task, and therefore they would obtain more
enjoyment (and thus greater value) if there are more other players to play with.
In addition to video games, rise of app-based technology has led to the emergence
of new products or services that display network effects (e.g., ride sharing services
and group buying deals). At the same time, expansion of social media has served
to strengthen the network effects for traditional products such as movies, television
8
9programs, and books by allowing people to easily participate in communities built
around those products. Furthermore, development of data storage/processing
tools offers a great chance for many firms to collect large amounts of data and
understand their customers’ purchasing behavior. For these firms, a significant
challenge — as well as opportunity — is to develop models of customer choice
behavior that incorporate network effects and to use such models to make better
pricing decisions.
We take up this issue, and address a pricing problem faced by a seller that
offers a given assortment of products that exhibit network effects. In particular,
we consider a setting in which demands for various products are determined by
a variant of the multinomial logit (MNL) model in which the expected utility
a typical consumer derives from purchasing an individual product depends on
its intrinsic quality, its price, and also a network effect term that is a linear
function of the market’s total consumption of that product. Given a product, the
slope of this network effect term represents the strength of that product’s network
effect. We focus on the seller’s optimal (i.e., revenue maximizing) pricing and sales
decisions. More specifically, we seek to answer the following three questions in
this chapter: (1) What is the structure of the optimal solution in this setting with
network effects? (2) Does the presence of network effects yield solutions that are
fundamentally different than those that arise in problems without network effects?
(3) How do optimal decisions depend upon the strength of network effects?
To answer these questions, we first consider a homogeneous case in which
model primitives, including the slope parameters that determine the strength
of the network effects, are the same across all products. We establish that the
10
optimal solution takes one of two different forms, depending upon the strength
of the network effect. When the network effect is relatively weak, we show that
it is optimal for the seller to price all the products identically. This result is
consistent with the classical MNL pricing problem without network effects for
which it is known that it is optimal to price homogeneous products identically
(we will review the literature below). We note, however, that although optimal
prices are identical when the network effect is weak, those prices are different
from the price that is optimal when there are no network effects. When the
network effect is strong enough, we show that the optimal pricing policy is such
that exactly one product is priced low and that all other products are priced at
a single higher price. As a result, the sales of the one low-price product will be
higher than those of each of the other products. This strategy that “boosts” the
sales quantity of one single product differs from the equal-pricing strategy that is
optimal in classical MNL models and thus is a unique feature that arises in the
presence of network effects. We also show that in such scenarios with a strong
network effect, if the network effect becomes stronger, then the optimal prices will
be such that the sales of the single low-price product will increase, while the sales
of each of the other products will decrease. As the strength of the network effect
increases, the solution becomes progressively more dissimilar to the solution of the
classic MNL model. In the limit as the network effect becomes “very strong” (i.e.,
as the aforementioned slope becomes very large), sales of the low-price product
grow to capture the entire market while the sales of all the high-priced products
decrease to zero. This stands in particularly stark contrast to the equal prices and
sales quantities that emerge in classical MNL pricing problems without network
11
effects.
Next we study a general problem in which parameters are heterogeneous across
products. In such cases we find that the optimal prices will generally all be
distinct. Nevertheless, the optimal solution retains some of the structure seen in
the homogeneous case. In particular, the sales of at most one product will be
boosted by pricing it low, while all other products will be priced high. A precise
meaning of “low” and “high” will be provided later. The main idea is that there are
many candidate price vectors that may satisfy the first-order necessary optimality
conditions for maximizing revenues. If we restrict attention to only these potential
optimal price vectors (which is sufficient for finding an optimal solution) then at
most a single product will be priced at its lowest potential value while all others
will be priced at their highest potential values. We exploit this structure to obtain
an computational algorithm that quickly solves the multi-product pricing problem
— for an arbitrary number of products — with a simple two-dimensional search.
To better understand each parameter’s impact on the pricing decisions, we
examine settings in which only network effect parameters or price sensitivities
differ across products. Such settings have a limited degree of heterogeneity. This
allows us to obtain stronger results than in the fully heterogeneous case. For
instance, we are able to establish that the products’ prices will take the reverse
(respectively, same) order as the products’ network effect (resp., price sensitivity)
parameters. Moreover, the seller will boost only the sales of the product with
highest network effect (resp., lowest price sensitivity) parameter or else boost none
at all. We also obtain further simplifications to our computational algorithm.
Finally, we discuss settings in which there are inter-product network effects
12
(i.e., the sales of one product may affect the utility a customer gains from
purchasing another product), settings in which network effects enter through
more-general functional forms in individual customers’ utility functions, and
settings in which the no-purchase option experiences network effects. We show
that most of our results hold in these more general cases. Overall, our results
present a clear picture of the optimal pricing strategy for a wide class of
multi-product pricing problems with network effects.
From a technical point of view, there are several novel aspects of the analysis
in this chapter. First, unlike in the classical MNL model, demand cannot be
written as an explicit function of the prices. Instead, for any vector of prices, sales
quantities arise as a fixed point of a mapping that comes from inclusion of the
network effects. Second, even after transforming the problem so that demand is
the primary decision variable, the objective function in the revenue maximization
problem is the sum of a convex function and a concave function, which in general is
difficult to analyze. This too differs from the classical MNL case, for which it is well
known that revenue is a concave function of demand. Nevertheless, by exploiting
the special structure of our problem, we are able to show that the problem with
network effects admits a remarkably simple solution structure. That structure
allows us to solve the problem quickly, and also reveals key tradeoffs. Finally, in
order to explore the comparative statics of optimal solutions with respect to the
network effect parameters, we introduce a novel transformation of variables. After
transformation, the objective function satisfies a supermodularity property that
does not exist in the forms of the optimization problem that have either prices or
sales as the decision variables. The key of the transformation is the selection of
13
an orthogonal matrix that maps the sum of the original variables to a single new
variable, and that maps the region described by certain constraints on the unit
simplex in the original problem to a sublattice. Since simplex constraints and
objective functions that depend on the sum of variables are typical in allocation
problems, we believe such a transformation could be useful in other contexts.
In the introductory chapter, we have already reviewed much related literature.
These works can be categorized into two lines: multi-product problems studies and
network products studies. In the line of multi-product problem studies, in addition
to pricing optimization problems, there are other recent work that addresses
pricing, assortment planning, or availability problems for the MNL model or
its variants includes, e.g., van Ryzin and Mahajan (1999), Talluri and van Ryzin
(2004), Aydin and Porteus (2008), Suh and Aydin (2011), Wang (2012), and
Davis et al. (2013). To draw an important distinction between this chapter and
this line of work on operational decision making with MNL models and their
relatives, we note that none of the papers mentioned above consider network
effects. Among the other line of dealing with products with network effects,
Starkweather (2003) also studies pricing and product compatibility problems
based upon an MNL model with network effects. However, Starkweather does
not find optimal prices and sales levels for a revenue maximizing seller or study
how the strength of network effects influences those quantities. Thus this chapter
is quite different from that of Starkweather. In a recent paper, Wang and Wang
(2016) consider assortment planning problems in which sales are governed by the
MNL model with network effects. However, they do not consider pricing decisions,
which are the topic of this chapter.
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The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the MNL
model with network effects. Section 2.3 focuses on the homogeneous-products case
and contains two theorems that describe properties of optimal solutions in that
case. Section 2.4 focuses on settings with heterogeneous products. Section 2.6
describes results of numerical studies. Section 2.5 discusses three extensions to
the MNL model with network effects. Section 2.7 concludes the chapter. Proofs
and extensions are contained in appendices.
2.2 The General Model
We consider a variant of the MNL choice model that incorporates network effects
in customer utilities. Suppose a single seller has a line of n products indexed by
i ∈ N = {1, . . . , n} to sell to a market of total sizeM . Each individual customer in
the market buys at most one of the n products. Such a customer may also decide
not to purchase, in which case we view this as selecting the “no purchase” product,
which is indexed by 0. The market is comprised of “infinitesimal” customers, so
the probability that an individual customer purchases product i is also the overall
fraction of customers that purchase product i. The utility a customer obtains
from purchasing product i is
ui = vi + ǫi,
where vi is the expected utility from consuming product i and ǫi is a random
variable that represents customer-specific idiosyncracies. As in the standard
MNL model, we assume ǫ0, ǫ1, . . . , ǫn are i.i.d. Gumbel random variables. In our
model, vi is determined by the quality of product i, its price, and a network effect
15
term that depends upon the market’s overall consumption of that product. More
precisely, for i ∈ N we have
vi = yi − γipi + αixi, (2.1)
where yi is the intrinsic utility of product i, γi > 0 is the price sensitivity
parameter, pi is the price, αi is the network effect sensitivity parameter, and
xi is the market’s overall consumption of product i. The parameter αi represents
the strength of network effects for product i. A larger value of αi makes the
utility of product i for an individual more sensitive to others’ consumption of
that product. In the basic model, we assume the network effect on vi depends
only on the market’s consumption of product i itself. In Section 2.5.1, we will
extend the model to consider settings in which the network effect also depends
on the market’s consumption of other products. Throughout, we shall assume
that αi ≥ 0. This means that each customer gains greater utility from product
i if more other customers purchase product i. In Section 2.5.2 we allow a more
general form of network effects by replacing αixi in (2.1) by fi(xi) where fi(·) is
a function that satisfies some conditions. These conditions are satisfied by, for
instance, f(x) = log(x+ 1) and f(x) = x2.
As is common in the literature, without loss of generality, we normalize v0
to zero. (We also assume that there is no network effect for the no-purchase
option. We relax this assumption in Appendix 2.5.3.) We assume that yi ≥ 0,
which indicates that when offered any product for free, a customer is expected to
obtain higher utility from accepting it than not. By standard results for the MNL
model, if we are given consumption levels x1, . . . , xn and prices p1, . . . , pn, then
16
the probability that a customer purchases product i ∈ N is
qi = P (ui = maxj∈{0,1,...,n}uj) =
exp(vi)
1 +
∑n
j=1 exp(vj)
=
exp(yi − γipi + αixi)
1 +
∑n
j=1 exp(yj − γjpj + αjxj)
.
(2.2)
Because of the infinitesimal customer assumption mentioned above, qi is also
the fraction of the M customers that purchase product i. Thus we have
xi = Mqi. (2.3)
Without loss of generality, we can further normalize the total market size
to M = 1. (To see this, we can redefine α˜i = Mαi and the problem will be
equivalent.) With this normalization in place, we will refer to qi as the sales
quantity (or simply sales) of product i. Conditions (2.2)–(2.3) now reduce to
qi = Fi(q) for all i ∈ N where Fi(q) = exp(yi − γipi + αiqi)
1 +
∑n
j=1 exp(yj − γjpj + αjqj)
. (2.4)
Note that sales quantities affect choice probabilities, which themselves affect sales
quantities. Hence, the preceding expression (2.4) may be viewed as an equilibrium
condition. In equilibrium, a vector of sales quantities q = (q1, . . . , qn) must be such
that for each product i ∈ N , the sales of that product qi equals the probability
that a customer will purchase that product given the sales q. We can obtain a
slightly different justification of (2.4) by interpreting x1, . . . , xn on the right side
of (2.2) as customers’ perceptions of sales levels, in which case (2.4) can be viewed
as a rational expectations equilibrium of sorts in which customers’ perceptions are
consistent with reality.
The seller wishes to select prices that maximize its total revenue. (Without
loss of generality we assume the cost to the seller of the products is zero.) Given
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any price vector p = (p1, . . . , pn), the function F (q) = (F1(q), . . . , Fn(q)) is a
continuous function of q = (q1, . . . , qn) from [0, 1]
n to [0, 1]n. By the Brouwer fixed
point theorem, there exists at least one solution to (2.4). In general, given prices
p, there could be more than one q that satisfies (2.4). Nevertheless, given any q
satisfying q1, . . . , qn > 0 and
∑
i∈N qi < 1, there is a unique p = (p1(q), . . . , pn(q))
defined by
pi(q) =
1
γi
(
αiqi − log qi + log
(
1−
n∑
j=1
qj
)
+ yi
)
(2.5)
such that (2.4) holds for q. For some q, if the seller charges prices determined
by (2.5), there may be solutions to (2.4) other than q. We will discuss the issue
of potential existence of multiple equilibria in Section 2.6.1 and Appendix 4.2.
For now, we assume that the seller has the capability to choose the sales q by
implementing prices (p1(q), . . . , pn(q)). This allows us to use q = (q1, . . . , qn) as
the decision variables.
Now, with q = (q1, . . . , qn) as the primary variables, the seller’s total revenue
is
π(q) =
n∑
j=1
qjpj(q)
=
n∑
j=1
αj
γj
q2j +
n∑
j=1
qj
γj
log
(
1−
n∑
j=1
qj
)
+
n∑
j=1
qj
γj
(yj − log qj) .
(2.6)
The seller’s multi-product pricing problem can now be formulated as the following
optimization problem:
max π(q1, . . . , qn)
s.t.
n∑
j=1
qj ≤ 1
qi ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , n.
(P0)
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In the following sections, we analyze the preceding maximization problem,
and study optimal choices of both sales quantities q and prices p. We will pay
particular attention to how network effects influence optimal decisions.
2.3 The Homogeneous Case
In this section, we consider a special case of the general model, in which all
n products have the same intrinsic utilities, price sensitivities, and network
sensitivities. That is yi = y, γi = γ, and αi = α for all i ∈ N . In the classical
multi-product price optimization problem (when α = 0), it is well known that the
optimal decision is to set all prices to be equal (and the sales of different products
are equal); see, e.g., Gallego and Wang (2014) and references therein. As we will
see shortly, this may not be the case in the presence of network effects, even in
this homogeneous setting.
In the homogeneous setting, there is no loss of generality to assume γ = 1, and
therefore we take γ = 1 in the remainder of this section. With this assumption,
given q = (q1, . . . , qn), the expression (2.5) for prices becomes
pi(q) = αqi − log qi + log
(
1−
n∑
j=1
qj
)
+ y, (2.7)
and the total revenue (2.6) becomes
π(q) = α
n∑
j=1
q2j +
n∑
j=1
qj
(
y + log
(
1−
n∑
j=1
qj
))
−
n∑
j=1
qj log qj . (2.8)
Note that the objective function (2.8) is symmetric in q. Thus we can assume
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q1 ≥ q2 ≥ · · · ≥ qn in (P0) without loss of optimality. Then problem (P0) becomes
max π(q1, . . . , qn)
s.t.
n∑
j=1
qj ≤ 1
qi ≥ qi+1, i = 1, . . . , n− 1
qn ≥ 0.
(P1)
In the following, we will study the structure of the optimal solution to problem
(P1). In addition, we will identify how optimal sales quantities and optimal prices
respond to different values of the network sensitivity parameter α.
Before we state our main result, we first specify a means of selecting a
particular optimal solution to problem (P1) in case there are multiple optimal
solutions. The situation of having multiple optimal solutions is not typical,
therefore one can view the discussion below as mainly serving technical purposes.
Nevertheless, the way we select a specific optimal solution is closely connected to
our analysis, in which we perform a transformation of variables and analyze the
problem using the transformed variables. Let e be an n-vector of ones. Define Q∗
to be the set containing all optimal solutions to (P1) and define q∗ = (q∗1, . . . , q
∗
n)
as
q
∗ = {q|q ∈ Q∗ and eTAq ≥ eTAq′ for all q′ ∈ Q∗}, (2.9)
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where A = (Aij)n×n is an orthogonal matrix defined by
Aij =

1√
n
i = 1
1√
(i−1)i i ≥ 2, i > j
− i−1√
(i−1)i i ≥ 2, i = j
0 otherwise.
(2.10)
Later we will show that q∗ defined above is unique. That is, the set on the
right side of (2.9) contains only a single element. A key step in our analysis is
to make a change of variables s = Aq in (P1). We will establish that after the
change of variables, the objective function will be supermodular in (s, α). Such
supermodularity is not present when the variables are sales or prices. As will be
verified later, such a transformation also has the following key properties: (i) s1
corresponds to the scaled sum of the qi, (ii) each si, i ≥ 2 corresponds to a weighted
sum of differences between each qj (j ≤ i) and qi; and (iii) an ordered simplex
in the q-space (the feasible region of (P1)) is still a sublattice in the s-space.
These properties of the transformation allow us to appeal to monotonicity results
on the maximization of supermodular functions on a sublattice, which yield the
comparative statics described in our main results below. Full details appear in
our subsequent analysis.
To get some more intuition regarding the above definition, it is instructive to
consider a problem with n = 2, in which case we have
A =
 1/√2 1/√2
1/
√
2 −1/√2
 and s =
 s1
s2
 = Aq = 1√
2
 q1 + q2
q1 − q2
 .
Here, the variables become scaled versions of the total sales (q1 + q2) and the
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difference of the sales quantities (q1 − q2).
The following result describes the optimal solution to (P1) and shows how that
solution depends upon the strength α of the network effects. The proof can be
found in Appendix 4.2.
Theorem 2.3.1. There exists αˆ (which depends upon y and n) such that
(a) if α ≤ αˆ, then q∗1 = q∗2 = · · · = q∗n and q∗i increases in α for all i ∈ N ;
(b) if α > αˆ, then q∗1 > q
∗
2 = · · · = q∗n and q∗1 increases in α, q∗i decreases in
α for i ≥ 2, and ∑i∈N q∗i increases in α. Moreover, limα→∞ q∗1 = 1 and
limα→∞ q∗i = 0 for i = 2, . . . , n.
In addition, let αR be the unique solution to R(α) = y + log(2α− n)− n
2α−n = 0.
Then 1/2 < αˆ ≤ αR. Furthermore, if n = 2, then αˆ = αR.
For the intuition behind Theorem 2.3.1, consider the objective function (2.8),
and suppose we fix the sum
∑n
j=1 qj to a constant. With this added constraint,
the problem is equivalent to maximizing α
∑n
j=1 q
2
j −
∑n
j=1 qj log qj . Note that
α
∑n
j=1 q
2
j is convex in q while −
∑n
j=1 qj log qj is concave in q. When α is
small, the concave term dominates and the optimal solution is symmetric. This
corresponds to part (a) of the theorem. On the other hand, when α is large enough,
the convex term dominates the concave term. Because the maximal point of a
symmetric convex function must be on the boundary, the optimal solution in
this case is no longer symmetric. This corresponds to part (b) of the theorem.
From the preceding discussion, it is apparent that the optimal solution must be
symmetric if α < 0.
22
In addition to providing structural insights, Theorem 2.3.1 greatly simplifies
the process of calculating an optimal solution to (P1). The objective function in
(P1) is in general neither concave nor convex, and thus finding a global maximum
may not be easy, especially when n is large. However, Theorem 2.3.1 allows us to
narrow the search dimension from n to 2 (and to 1 for small enough values of α),
thereby obtaining a problem that is easily solvable by a brute force search. For
any α, we can also further simplify computation of the optimal solution by using
the approach described later in Section 2.4.1 that allows us to solve the problem
using a one-dimensional search.
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Figure 2.1: Optimal q∗ as a function of α
Next, we will present two examples to illustrate the above results. In both
examples we set y = 2. In Figure 2.1(a) we take n = 2, and in Figure 2.1(b) we
take n = 3. Both figures show how the optimal q∗ changes with α. As one can
see, in both cases, when α is small, all the entries in q∗ are equal and increase
monotonically in α. When α passes a certain threshold, q∗1 becomes the single
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largest entry of q∗ and all the other entries remain identical and smaller than q∗1.
In addition, the largest entry increases in α while all the other entries decrease in
α. Theorem 2.3.1 describes this pattern. In Figure 2.1(a), the threshold is α = 1.5,
which is precisely the solution to R(α) = 0 at y = 2, n = 2. In Figure 2.1(b), the
threshold is around α = 1.99 and the solution to R(α) = 0 is αR = 2.16. Thus
the thresholds are consistent with the result in Theorem 2.3.1.
Observe in Figure 2.1(b) that q∗ is not continuous in α and that there is a jump
at the threshold αˆ. This discontinuity arises from the inherent non-concavity of
the problem. When α is close to αˆ, there are separate local optima of the form
q1 = · · · = qn and of the form q1 > q2 = · · · = qn. When α is smaller than αˆ,
the former local optimal achieves a higher objective value, and when α is larger
than αˆ, the latter local optimal achieves a higher objective value. The optimal
solution jumps from one local optimal to another as α passes αˆ. To help better
understand this phenomenon, let Π(d) denote the highest objective value in (P1)
with the added constraints q1 − q2 = d and q2 = · · · = qn. (So we can solve
(P1) by maximizing Π(d) over d.) Figures 2.2(a) and 2.2(b) show Π(d) plotted
against d for two distinct values of α in the example from Figure 2.1(b). In
both Figure 2.2(a) and Figure 2.2(b), one can see two peaks corresponding to the
aforementioned two local optima. In Figure 2.2(a) in which α = 1.98, the left
peak achieves a higher objective value, and thus the entries of q∗ are all equal
(d = 0). In Figure 2.2(b) in which α = 1.99, the right peak achieves a higher
objective value, and thus q∗1 > q
∗
2 at optimality (d > 0). The discontinuity in
Figure 2.1(b) arises as we move from a range in which the left peak is higher to
a range in which the right peak is higher. (We can show that when n ≤ 2, the
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optimal q∗ is always continuous in α, and thus the discontinuity does not appear
in Figure 2.1(a). The proof is given in Appendix 4.2.)
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Figure 2.2: Two local optima of Π(d)
In addition to the sales q∗, we are also interested in the optimal prices p∗ =
(p1(q
∗), . . . , pn(q∗)) induced by (2.7). We have the following theorem describing
the behavior of p∗ for different values of α. The proof, which relies heavily on
Theorem 2.3.1, is in Appendix 4.2.
Theorem 2.3.2. Let αˆ be defined as in Theorem 2.3.1.
(a) If α ≤ αˆ, then p∗1 = p∗2 = · · · = p∗n = p∗ and one of the following three
scenarios holds.
(i) p∗ increases monotonically in α, or
(ii) p∗ decreases monotonically in α, or
(iii) p∗ first decreases and then increases in α.
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(b) If α > αˆ, then p∗1 < p
∗
2 = · · · = p∗n and p∗2 increases in α. Moreover,
limα→∞ p∗1 =∞ and limα→∞ p∗2 =∞.
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Figure 2.3: Optimal p∗ as a function of α
In Figure 2.3, we use four examples to illustrate the behavior of p∗ in Theorem
2.3.2. Figures 2.3(a) and 2.3(b) correspond to the same two cases as Figures 2.1(a)
and 2.1(b). In both examples, the optimal prices increase in α when α ≤ αˆ, which
corresponds to the first scenario in part (a). In Figure 2.3(c), we take n = 2,
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y = 0 and in this case, the optimal prices decrease in α when α ≤ αˆ, which
corresponds to the second scenario in part (a). In Figure 2.3(d), we take n = 2,
y = 1 and now the optimal prices first decrease and then increase in α when α ≤ αˆ,
which corresponds to the third scenario in part (a). With only the eye, it may
be difficult to discern the pattern of the prices to the left of αˆ in Figure 2.3(d);
however, our numerical calculations confirm that the prices are indeed decreasing
and then increasing in that range. In all four figures, when α exceeds αˆ, the higher
price(s) monotonically increase in α while the lower price may initially decrease
but eventually will increase in α.
As the theorem shows, the behavior of the optimal prices p∗ in response to
network effects is more complicated than that of the optimal sales quantities q∗.
This can be explained by considering two forces driving the direction of the pricing
strategy in response to an increase in α. One is to increase the prices to get more
unit revenue; the other is to pull down the prices to generate more demand. The
results in Theorem 2.3.2 reflect this tradeoff. When α is small, the combined force
could be in either direction; when α grows sufficiently large, i.e., the products have
already attracted a large share of demand, the first force is stronger, and thus it
is more profitable for the seller to raise the prices in response to the increase in α.
In the remainder of this section, we discuss the main steps of the proof of
Theorem 2.3.1. (The complete proof is provided in the appendix.) We start with
a proposition. The conditions in (2.11) below are derived from the first-order
optimality conditions for (P1).
Proposition 2.3.3. There are at most two distinct entries in q∗ = (q∗1, . . . , q
∗
n),
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and
2αq∗i − log q∗i = C
(∑
j∈N
q∗j
)
for all i ∈ N , (2.11)
where C(σ) = 1
1−σ − log(1− σ)− y.
To provide some insight into Theorem 2.3.1, a key point is that the expression
on the right side in (2.11) does not depend upon i, and hence the expression on
the left, 2αq∗i − log q∗i must be the same for all i ∈ N as well. It follows from
the strict convexity of the function h(q) = 2αq − log q that there are at most two
distinct entries in q∗ as indicated in Theorem 2.3.1. In the appendix, we show
that among the entries of q∗, at most one takes the larger value, while all others
must take the smaller value.
To prove the portions of the theorem that describe how the sales q∗ vary with
α, we apply the variable transformation mentioned earlier. Let s = Aq, where A
is given by (2.10). Then s = (s1, . . . , sn) can be written in terms of q as follows
si =

1√
n
∑n
j=1 qj i = 1
1√
(i−1)i
∑i−1
j=1 qj − i−1√(i−1)iqi i = 2, . . . , n.
(2.12)
As explained earlier, the change of variables above allows us to appeal to
monotonicity results about maximizers of supermodular functions. Since A is
an orthogonal matrix, q = A−1s = ATs, and thus qi can be written as
qi =

s1√
n
+
∑n
j=2
sj√
(j−1)j i = 1
s1√
n
− (i−1)si√
(i−1)i +
∑n
j=i+1
sj√
(j−1)j i = 2, . . . , n.
(2.13)
After substituting for q in terms of s, the objective function of (P1) becomes
π˜(s1, . . . , sn) = α
n∑
i=1
s2i +
√
ns1
(
y + log(1−√ns1)
)− n∑
i=1
qi log qi, (2.14)
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where qi is defined in (2.13). The constraints of (P1) are equivalent to
1√
n
≥ s1 ≥
√
n− 1sn, s2 ≥ 0, and si+1 ≥
√
i− 1
i+ 1
si, i = 2, . . . , n− 1.
Therefore, we can equivalently write (P1) as an optimization problem over s:
max π˜(s1, . . . , sn)
s.t.
1√
n
≥ s1 ≥
√
n− 1sn
s2 ≥ 0
si+1 ≥
√
i− 1
i+ 1
si, i = 2, . . . , n− 1.
(P2)
It follows from the preceding developments that a vector q of sales quantities is
optimal for (P1) if and only if s = Aq is optimal for (P2). We have the following
result about problem (P2).
Proposition 2.3.4. π˜(s1, . . . , sn) is supermodular in (s, α) and the feasible region
of (P2) is a sublattice in Rn. There exists an entry-wise maximal optimal solution
s
∗ = (s∗1, . . . , s
∗
n) to (P2) such that s
∗
i ≥ si for i = 1, . . . , n for any other optimal
s = (s1, . . . , sn). Moreover, s
∗ increases monotonically in α.
The uniqueness of q∗ in (2.9) follows from Proposition 2.3.4. To see this,
observe that if there are multiple optimal q for (P1), then (2.9) picks among them
by selecting those for which the sum of the entries of s = Aq is largest. The
proposition establishes that there is an entry-wise maximal optimal solution s∗
to (P2). Of course, s∗ must also have the property that the sum of its entries is
strictly greater than that of any other optimal s. So q∗ is unique and q∗ = A−1s∗.
Using the monotonicity properties of s∗ from the proposition, we can prove the
monotonicity properties of q∗ that are stated in Theorem 2.3.1. Details appear in
Appendix 4.2.
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2.4 The Heterogeneous Case
In this section, we consider the general problem (P0) in which network sensitivities
(the αi), price sensitivities (the γi), and intrinsic utilities (the yi) differ across
products. In contrast to the homogeneous setting described in Section 2.3, here
the entries of optimal quantity and price vectors will generally all be distinct.
Nevertheless, we show below that the optimal solutions in the heterogeneous case
have a structure similar to that which underlies Theorems 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 in the
homogeneous setting. In addition, based on this structure, we show that (P0)
remains amenable to solution for general problems with heterogeneous product
parameters.
We will begin with a proposition that describes the first-order optimality
conditions for problem (P0).
Lemma 2.4.1. Any optimal solution q† = (q†1, . . . , q
†
n) to (P0) must satisfy
2αiq
†
i − log q†i = Ci(q†) for all i ∈ N , (2.15)
where Ci(q) = γi
∑n
j=1 qj/γj
1−∑nj=1 qj − log(1−
∑n
j=1 qj) + 1− yi.
To further understand the form of the solution to (P0), we need to understand
the behavior of the expression that appears on the left side of (2.15).
Lemma 2.4.2. The function hα(q) = 2αq − log q is convex in q. In addition, we
have the following.
1. For c > 1 + log (2α), hα(q) = c has two solutions, q
c < qc. Furthermore,
qc ∈ (0, 1/2α) and qc decreases in c, while qc ∈ (1/2α,∞) and qc increases
in c.
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2. For c = 1 + log (2α), there is only one solution q = 1/2α to hα(q) = c.
3. For c < 1 + log (2α), there is no solution to hα(q) = c.
Proofs of the preceding lemmas can be found in Appendix 4.2. For i ∈ N
and c ≥ 1 + log(2αi), define qci ≤ qci to be the solutions to hαi(q) = c. (For
c = 1 + log(2αi), we have q
c
i = q
c
i = 1/2αi.) It is easy to find q
ci and qci by the
convexity of hαi(q). We now have the following proposition, which describes an
important property of the optimal solution to (P0).
Proposition 2.4.3. Any optimal solution q† to (P0) must have one of the
following two structures:
(a) q†i = q
Ci
i for all i ∈ N ; or
(b) q†i = q
Ci
i and q
†
j = q
Cj
j for all j ∈ N\{i} for some single i ∈ N
where Ck = Ck(q
†) for k ∈ N and Ck(·) is defined in Lemma 2.4.1.
From the proposition, we see that for an optimal solution, there is at most one
sales quantity that takes the “high value” qCii , while all the other sales quantities
must take their “low values” q
Cj
j . Recall that we also found this form of solution in
Theorem 2.3.1 for the homogeneous setting. Therefore, although we have distinct
qi with heterogeneous parameters across different i, the structure of the solution
remains similar. Thus, a general optimal pricing strategy for the multi-product
pricing problem with network effects is either to maintain a semblance of balance
among all products (all qi take the low value) or else to boost the sales of just one
product (only one qi takes the high value).
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Proposition 2.4.3 essentially says that it is never optimal to promote more
than one product simultaneously. To understand this, suppose we fix the sum∑n
j=1 qj = K. Then the objective function (2.6) can be rewritten as π(q) =∑n
j=1 πj(qj) where πj(qj) =
1
γj
(
αjq
2
j + (yj + log (1−K))qj − qj log qj
)
. We have
π′′j (qj) =
1
γj
(
2αj − 1qj
)
, so πj(qj) is concave when qj is low (qj < 1/2αj) and is
convex when qj is high (qj > 1/2αj). Suppose at an optimal solution q there are
two entries qi and qj that lie in the regions of convexity. Consider q
ǫ = q + ǫeij
and q−ǫ = q− ǫeij where eij is an n-vector of zeros except that its i-th entry is 1
and its j-th entry is −1. When ǫ is sufficiently small, due to the local convexity
of πi(·) and πj(·) at qi and qj respectively, we have πi(qi+ ǫ) + πi(qi− ǫ) > 2πi(qi)
and πj(qj + ǫ) + πj(qj − ǫ) > 2πj(qj). Therefore π(qǫ) + π(q−ǫ) > 2π(q), implying
at least one of qǫ and q−ǫ performs better than q, which is a contradiction with
the optimality of q. A more rigorous proof of Proposition 2.4.3 is provided in
Appendix 4.2.
In view of the non-concavity of the objective function (2.6), it is important
to develop a specialized computational approach for (P0). We take this up next.
Given a c = (c1, . . . , cn), consider the vectors q for which
2αiqi − log qi = ci for all i ∈ N . (2.16)
Note that there are at most 2n such q. For each such q, if Ci (q) = ci for all
i ∈ N then we have a q that satisfies (2.15) and that is an initial candidate to
be an optimal solution to (P0). A key insight is that by Proposition 2.4.3, given
a c, we can a priori eliminate all but (n + 1) of the vectors q that satisfy (2.16).
By searching through vectors c that can potentially appear on the right side of
(2.15), we arrive at a set of “non-eliminated” candidate solutions q each of which
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satisfies (2.15). We evaluate the objective function at each element in that set.
The one with the greatest objective value is an optimal solution.
Such a search may at first seem impractical because c is an n-dimensional
vector. However, it turns out that the search through c can be reduced to
a two-dimensional search. To motivate the approach, observe that if we let
K1 =
∑n
j=1 q
†
j and K2 =
∑n
j=1 q
†
j/γj, then Ci(q
†) in (2.15) is given by Ci(q†) =
γiK2/(1 −K1) − log(1 −K1) + 1 − yi. Hence, it suffices to search over values of
K1 and K2 to find sales vectors that satisfy the necessary condition (2.15). To
implement the algorithm one must specify discretization grids and stopping rules.
See Rayfield et al. (2015) for such developments for a nested logit pricing problem
without network effects. We do not pursue this here because it is not the main
focus of this chapter. We summarize the above procedures in Algorithm 1. After
running the algorithm, we can also compute the optimal prices using (2.5).
Algorithm 1. 1. Let γmin and γmax be the minimum and maximum values
among γ1, . . . , γn.
2. Let Q = ∅. For K1 from 0 to 1, for K2 from K1/γmax to K1/γmin:
(a) Calculate ci = γiK2/(1−K1)− log(1−K1)+ 1− yi for i = 1, . . . , n. If
ci < 1 + log(2αi) for any i ∈ N , then skip steps (b)–(d) and continue
to the next (K1, K2) pair.
(b) Solve for qcii and q
ci
i that satisfy 2αiq − log q = ci for i ∈ N .
(c) Let q = (qc11 , q
c2
2 , . . . , q
cn
n ) and for i = 1, . . . , n let q
i =
(qc11 , . . . , q
ci−1
i−1 , q
ci
i , q
ci+1
i+1 . . . , q
cn
n ). Here, q
i is the same as q except that
the i-th entry is replaced by qcii . Let R = {q, q1, q2, . . . , qn}.
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(d) For each q ∈ R: if both K1 =
∑n
j=1 qj and K2 =
∑n
j=1 qj/γj hold then
let Q = Q ∪ {q}.
3. End For-Loop over (K1, K2).
4. Evaluate (2.6) at each element in Q to find q† that maximizes (2.6).
The above developments reveal an important structural property of the
optimal solution and provide an effective approach to solve the general problem
(P0). However, they do not tell us which product (if any) should have the high
sales value. In the ensuing subsections, we describe two special cases for which we
are able to more precisely identify the structure of the solution and more easily
solve the problem.
2.4.1 Heterogeneous Network Sensitivities
In this section, we consider a version of (P0) in which only network sensitivities
differ across products. To be more specific, we assume α1 > · · · > αn, and yi = y
and γi = γ = 1 for i ∈ N . (There is no additional loss of generality in taking
γ = 1.) In this case, the revenue function (2.6) becomes
π(q) =
n∑
j=1
αjq
2
j +
n∑
j=1
qj
(
y + log
(
1−
n∑
j=1
qj
))
−
n∑
j=1
qj log qj . (2.17)
We refer to the revenue maximization problem (P0) with the objective function
specialized to (2.17) as (P3). The following proposition summarizes properties of
the optimal solution to (P3). The proof is in Appendix 4.2.
Proposition 2.4.4. For any optimal solution q† = (q†1, . . . , q
†
n) to (P3)
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1. q† must satisfy q†1 > · · · > q†n and
2αiq
†
i − log q†i = C
(∑
j∈N
q†j
)
for all i ∈ N , (2.18)
where C(σ) = 1
1−σ − log(1− σ)− y.
2. For q†, we have C ≥ 1 + log (2α1), where C := C
(∑
j∈N q
†
j
)
. In addition,
q†1 ∈ {qC1 , qC1 } and q†i = qCi for i = 2, . . . , n.
3. The optimal prices p† = (p†1, . . . , p
†
n) = (p1(q
†), . . . , pn(q†)) obtained from q†
and (2.5) must satisfy p†1 < · · · < p†n.
From the proposition, we see that an optimal solution to problem (P3) follows
the similar structure as in Proposition 2.4.3, i.e., there is at most one entry in q†
that takes the “high value”. However, in this special case, we know for certain
that if one of these products needs to be promoted, the optimal choice is always
product 1 — the one associated with the largest network sensitivity parameter.
The result is not surprising. If we are given a set of products that have the same
intrinsic qualities and that possess equal price sensitivities and if the plan is to
promote exactly one among them, then the seller benefits the most by choosing
the product with the strongest network effect.
In this setting with intrinsic utilities and price sensitivities that are common
across all products, Algorithm 1 can be simplified to a one-dimensional search. To
see this, note that the right side of (2.18) depends just upon the sum of the entries
of q. Proposition 2.4.4 further simplifies the search for the optimal solution to
(P3), because it tells us that given a value of c, merely two out of the 2n vectors
q that satisfy 2αiqi− log qi = c are left to be evaluated. Specifically, we only need
to consider the q where qi = q
c
i for i = 2, . . . , n and either (a) q1 = q
c
1 or (b)
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q1 = q
c
1. Algorithm 2 below outlines an approach to solve (P3) based upon these
obervations.
Algorithm 2. 1. Let Q = ∅. For σ from 0 to 1:
(a) Calculate c = 1
1−σ − log (1− σ)−y. If c < 1+log (2α1), then skip steps
(b)–(d) and continue to the next σ.
(b) Solve for qc1 and q
c
i for i ∈ N that satisfy 2αiq − log q = c.
(c) Let q = (qc1, q
c
2, . . . , q
c
n) and q
1 = (qc1, q
c
2, . . . , q
c
n). Let R = {q, q1}.
(d) For each q ∈ R: if C(∑j∈N qj) = c holds then let Q = Q ∪ {q}.
2. End For-Loop over σ.
3. Evaluate (2.17) at each element in Q to find q† that maximizes (2.6).
2.4.2 Heterogeneous Price Sensitivities
In this section, we consider a variation in which customers have heterogeneous
price sensitivities for the n products, i.e., the γi are distinct while other parameters
are the same across different products (αi = α and yi = y). Throughout this
section we assume γ1 < · · · < γn. In this setting, the revenue function (2.6)
becomes
π(q) = α
n∑
j=1
q2j
γj
+
n∑
j=1
qj
γj
(
y + log
(
1−
n∑
i=1
qi
))
−
n∑
j=1
qj
γj
log qj . (2.19)
We refer to (P0) with the objective function specialized to (2.19) as (P4). The
next proposition describes the optimal solution to (P4). The proof is in Appendix
4.2.
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Proposition 2.4.5. For any optimal solution q† = (q†1, . . . , q
†
n) to (P4)
1. q† must satisfy q†1 > · · · > q†n and
2αq†i − log q†i = Ci(q†) for all i ∈ N , (2.20)
where Ci(q) = γi
∑n
j=1 qj/γj
1−∑nj=1 qj − log(1−
∑n
j=1 qj) + 1− y.
2. At q†, we have Ci ≥ 1 + log (2α), where Ci := Ci(q†) for i = 1, . . . , n. In
addition, q†1 ∈ {qC11 , qC11 } and q†i = qCii for i = 2, . . . , n.
The preceding structure is similar to what is described in Proposition 2.4.4,
and is also useful for simplifying the computation of q†. In particular, the product
with the lowest price sensitivity may take a “high” sales level while all the other
products must take a “low” sales level. Proposition 2.4.5 can be easily modified
to accommodate heterogeneous intrinsic utilities that are ordered in the direction
opposite of the γi, i.e., y1 ≥ y2 ≥ · · · ≥ yn.
The computations in the case of heterogeneous price sensitivities considered
in this section are more difficult than those in subsection 2.4.1 (which considered
heterogeneous αi) because here 2αqi − log qi is no longer independent of i at
optimality. Nevertheless, we obtain some simplifications to Algorithm 1. In
particular, we can replace (b) and (c) by (b′) and (c′) as follows.
(b′) Solve for qc1 and qci that satisfy 2αq − log q = ci for i ∈ N .
(c′) Let q = (qc1, qc2 , . . . , qcn) and let q1 = (qc1, qc2 , . . . , qcn). Here, q1 is the
same as q except that the first entry is replaced by qc1. Let R = {q, q1}.
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2.5 Three Extensions
In this section, we consider three extensions to the basic MNL model with network
effects. In Section 2.5.1, we allow inter-product network effects. In Section 2.5.2,
we consider the possibility that network effects may enter customers’ expected
utility in a non-linear fashion. In Section 2.5.3, we consider network effects for
the no-purchase option.
2.5.1 Inter-product Network Effects
In this section, we incorporate inter-product network effects into consumers’
utilities. More precisely, we replace the customer’s utility function (2.1) with
vi = yi − γipi + αixi + βix−i,
where βi ≥ 0 is the inter-product network sensitivity parameter, and x−i =∑
j∈N\{i} xj is the total consumption of all products other than i. Hence, the
new term βix−i represents the additional expected utility for product i from the
market’s consumption of products other than i. We assume αi > βi, which means
that the within-product sensitivity is stronger than the inter-product sensitivity.
In the following, we consider a homogeneous case in which yi = y, γi = 1, αi =
α, and βi = β for all i ∈ N . Now the expression (2.7) becomes
pi(q) = αqi + βq−i − log qi + log
(
1−
n∑
j=1
qj
)
+ y,
and the revenue function (2.8) becomes
π(q) = (α− β)
n∑
j=1
q2j +
n∑
j=1
qj
(
y + β
n∑
j=1
qj + log
(
1−
n∑
j=1
qj
))
−
n∑
j=1
qj log qj .
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As in (P1), we may assume q1 ≥ · · · ≥ qn without loss of optimality. With the
same means of selecting a particular optimal solution as in (2.9), it turns out that
most of the results in Section 2.3 for (P1) still hold in this new setting.
In particular, Theorem 2.3.1 holds with the minor modification that the
threshold αˆ (which now depends upon y, n, and β) satisfies β + 1/2 < αˆ ≤ αR¯
where αR¯ is the smallest solution to R¯(α) = 0 where
R¯(α) = y + log(2α− 2β − n)− n
2α− 2β − n +
nβ
α− β .
Theorem 2.3.2 carries over without modification to this setting. The proofs of
these results follow almost exactly as the proofs of Theorems 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 with
only minor changes. A key step is using Proposition 2.3.3, but with α replaced
by α − β and C(σ) redefined as 1
1−σ − log (1− σ) − y − 2βσ. (We note that we
opted to consider the case without inter-product effects in the main body of the
chapter to help keep arguments as transparent as possible.)
2.5.2 Non-linear Network Effects
In this section, we consider a more general form of network effects. More precisely,
we assume the customer’s utility function (2.1) is replaced by
vi = yi − γipi + fi(xi),
where fi(xi) is the expected utility gained from the network effects. We assume
that fi(0) = 0 and that fi(·) is increasing. For simplicity, we also assume fi(·) is
differentiable. With the same normalization as in (2.3), the expression for prices
(2.5) becomes
pi(q) =
1
γi
(
fi(qi)− log qi + log
(
1−
n∑
j=1
qj
)
+ yi
)
,
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and the revenue function (2.6) becomes
π(q) =
n∑
j=1
qjfj(qj)
γj
+
n∑
j=1
qj
γj
log
(
1−
n∑
j=1
qj
)
+
n∑
j=1
qj
γj
(yj − log qj) . (2.21)
Using an analysis as in Section 2.4, we see that the optimal q† must satisfy
the first-order necessary conditions, and thus (2.16) becomes
q†i f
′
i(q
†
i ) + fi(q
†
i )− log q†i = Ci(q†) for all i ∈ N ,
where Ci(q) is as defined in Lemma 2.4.1. Note that if fi(q) = αiq, then q
†
i f
′
i(q
†
i )+
fi(q
†
i ) = 2αiq
†
i in which case the preceding condition simplifies to (2.15).
Define Hi(q) = qf
′
i(q) + fi(q)− log q. Below, we assume H ′′i (q) > 0 for q > 0.
In that case, for c ≥ minq Hi(q), we re-define qci ≤ qci to be the solutions Hi(q) = c.
(If there is only solution to Hi(q) = c, then we let both q
c
i and q
c
i be that solution.)
The original definition (for problems with fi(q) = αiq) appears in the paragraph
that follows Lemma 2.4.2.
Proposition 2.5.1. Suppose H ′′i (q) > 0 for all q > 0 for each i ∈ N . Then
Proposition 2.4.3 holds in the more general setting of (2.21), with qci and q
c
i
redefined as above.
Examples of functions fi(·) such that H ′′i (q) > 0 for all q > 0 are fi(q) =
log(1+ q) and fi(q) = αq
θ where α > 0 and θ ≥ 1. The proof of Proposition 2.5.1
follows almost exactly as the proofs of Lemma 2.4.2 and Proposition 2.4.3. As
long as the network effect term in the utility function satisfies the conditions in
Proposition 2.5.1, the optimal strategy remains to either maintain a semblance of
balance among all products or else to boost the sales of just one product.
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2.5.3 Network Effects for the No-Purchase Option
Here, we consider an extension of (P0) in which an individual customer’s utility
from not purchasing any product depends on the fraction of customers that do not
purchase. This setting captures the idea that the customers who do not choose
the products offered by our seller could buy a product from someone else. In this
case, (2.1) remains unchanged but v0 becomes
v0 = α0x0,
where x0 is the number of customers that do not buy any product offered by this
firm. With the same normalization as in (2.3), the expression (2.5) becomes
pi(q) =
1
γi
(
αiqi − log qi + log
(
1−
n∑
j=1
qj
)
+ yi − α0
(
1−
n∑
j=1
qj
))
,
and the revenue function (2.6) becomes
π(q) =
n∑
j=1
qjpj(q) =
n∑
j=1
αj
γj
q2j+
n∑
j=1
qj
γj
(
yj + log
(
1−
n∑
j=1
qj
)
− log qj − α0
(
1−
n∑
j=1
qj
))
.
As in Section 2.4, the optimal q† must satisfy the first-order necessary
conditions
2αiq
†
i − log q†i = Di(q†) for all i ∈ N , (2.22)
where Di(q) = Ci(q) + α0
(
1−∑nj=1 qj) − α0γi∑nj=1 qj/γj and Ci(q) is defined
in Lemma 2.4.1.
Since the left hand side of (2.22) remains the same as in (2.15), Lemma 2.4.2
still applies and the results of Proposition 2.4.3 still hold in this setting. The proofs
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follow exactly as before. Therefore even if the non-purchase option is sensitive to
network effects, the optimal strategy follows the same structure as in our basic
model.
2.6 Numerical Results
In this section, we describe some numerical experiments, which are divided into
three parts. First, we investigate the issue of possible multiple equilibria at optimal
prices and study how this may affect the implementation of the solution. Second,
for both homogeneous and heterogeneous cases, we demonstrate the importance
of taking into account network effects when making pricing decisions. In this
portion of the numerical study, we also show that Algorithm 1 solves the general
problem quickly. In the final portion of the numerical experiments, we describe
tests showing that the decisions obtained from our model are robust with respect
to estimation errors in the network strength parameters.
2.6.1 The Issue of Multiple Equilibria
As discussed earlier, one issue with the network MNL model is that given a price
vector p, there are possibly multiple q that satisfy the equilibrium condition (2.4).
We are particularly interested in this issue at prices p∗ = p(q∗), which are the
optimal prices obtained from our model. Appendix 4.2 addresses the question of
uniqueness and stability of solutions to (2.4). In this section, we study whether the
sales vector will converge to q∗ when prices are set at p∗ if customers repeatedly
adjust their purchases according to market conditions or their perceptions thereof.
42
Such issues are of interest even if q∗ is the unique equilibrium at prices p∗. In
addition, if we find that there is convergence to q∗ from all tested starting points
of the adjustment process, then this provides some evidence that q∗ is the unique
equilibrium (or at least the unique stable equilibrium) associated with prices p∗.
For this numerical study, we do the following:
1. Given a set of parameters {(αi, γi, yi) : i = N}, we use Algorithm 1 to find
the vector of optimal sales levels q∗. Then we calculate p∗ = p(q∗) from
(2.5).
2. From a starting sales vector q0, we iteratively compute qt using the following
dynamics:
qti =
exp(yi − γip∗i + αiqt−1i )
1 +
∑n
j=1 exp(yj − γjp∗j + αjqt−1j )
. (2.23)
3. We check whether the sequence {qt}∞t=0 converges to q∗.
The dynamics in (2.23) above could arise if there is a sequence of problem
instances indexed by t, and customers make their purchase decisions in instance
t based upon the sales levels in instance t− 1. Alternatively, in a single problem
instance, customers might hypothesize a vector of sales levels q0, which would
suggest to the customers that sales levels would be q1. Realizing this, customers
would then hypothesize sales levels q1, which would then suggest that sales levels
would be q2. Customers would continue in this fashion until the hypothesized
and suggested sales levels are (essentially) the same, at which point the customers
would make their purchases, thereby producing an actual vector of sales q. That
vector will be an equilibrium (that is, satisfy (2.4)) for prices p∗. If the seller
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initially announces that sales levels will be q∗ and if the population believes the
seller so that q0 = q∗, then the iterative procedure will converge immediately
to quantities q∗. The above admittedly endows the population of customers with
remarkably good mathematical faculties. (We should note that it is quite common
that game-theoretic models of customer behavior make strong assumptions about
what customers know and/or can compute.)
According to Proposition 4.2.2 in Appendix 4.2, the sales vector qt must
converge to q∗ when |αi| ≤ 2 for all i ∈ N . We first show that this is true in our
experiments with even more general αi. In particular, we consider n = 1, . . . , 5 and
for each n, we test 1000 randomly generated problems. To generate a problem,
we sample αi, yi and γi for i = 1, . . . , n from uniform distributions over [0, 4],
[0, 2], and [1, 2] respectively. In this first set of experiments, we focus on the
starting point q0 = 0 := (0, . . . , 0), which is a natural choice if initially no
customers buy any of the products. For each n, we compute the average of
‖qt − q∗‖ = (∑ni=1(qti − q∗i )2)1/2 over the 1000 experiments for different values
of t. The results are plotted in Figure 2.4. The figure shows that for each n, the
average of ‖qt−q∗‖ converges to 0 as t increases. In fact, in all of these experiments
q
t converges to q∗ starting from q0 = 0, and in most cases, qt becomes very close
to q∗ in fewer than 20 steps.
In the above experiments, the network strength parameters αi are not “very
large”. In the following, we consider some settings with larger values of αi in
which case we will see that qt may no longer converge to q∗. For simplicity, we
consider only the homogeneous case in the following. We apply steps 1-3 above
for values of α ranging from 0 to 7 with n = 5 and yi = y = 2, γi = γ = 1 for
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Figure 2.4: Average of ‖qt − q∗‖ versus t
i = 1, . . . , 5. For each value of α, we first study whether qt converges to q∗ when
starting from q0 = 0. Then, we consider 1000 different values for the initial vector
q
0 by sampling uniformly at random from the n-simplex, and we determine the
fraction of those 1000 cases in which the vector qt converges to q∗. The results
are summarized in Table 2.1. Within a cell in the row labeled “n = 5”, a ‘Yes’
at the top means that qt converges to q∗ when starting from q0 = 0 and a ‘No’
means it does not. The value below the ‘Yes’/‘No’ indicates the percentage of
the 1000 initial points for which qt converges to q∗. The bottom value in each
cell in the n = 5 row is the optimal objective function value for n = 5; i.e.,
π∗5 =
∑5
i=1 pi(q
∗)q∗i =
∑5
i=1 p
∗
i q
∗
i . We emphasize that this value is obtained from
sales quantities q∗.
From Table 2.1, we can see that when starting from q0 = 0, the vector of sales
levels qt converges to q∗ for α ≤ 4, but not for α ≥ 5. In fact, for α ≤ 4, there is
convergence to q∗ from all sampled starting points. However, for α ≥ 5, the vector
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α 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
n = 5
q
0 = 0 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Rd q0 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 11.8% 1.8%
π∗5 1.9445 2.0343 2.1295 2.4413 3.1210 3.8807 4.6843
n = 1
q0 = 0 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Rd q0 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 64.0% 41.7%
π∗1 1.0000 1.3216 1.8013 2.4142 3.1170 3.8801 4.6843
(π∗5 − π∗1)/π∗5 48.57% 35.03% 15.41% 1.11% 0.13% 0.02% <0.01%
Table 2.1: Convergence results for different values of α
q
t converges to q∗ only when q0 is “close enough” to q∗. The region that is close
enough shrinks as α increases, which is reflected by the decreasing percentage of
the randomly drawn initial conditions for which there is convergence to q∗. For
α = 7, just two of the 1000 samples give us convergence to q∗.
When α ≥ 5, the optimal q∗ follows the “one high, others low” pattern
described in part (b) of Theorem 2.3.1. In the cases for which there is not
convergence to q∗ from most initial conditions (the columns on the right in the
table), the low value in q∗ is very close to 0 and the high value is close to 1.
For instance, in the α = 7 case, we have q∗H = 0.9196 and q
∗
L = 8 × 10−6, with
corresponding π∗ = 5.5178. In that case, if we start from q0 = 0, then qt will
converge to a different equilibrium point with q′H = 0.0207 and q
′
L = 1 × 10−4
and the corresponding revenue is π′ = 0.1287 (we will further comment on this
phenomenon at the end of this section). It is important to note that it is not
the “one high, others low” pattern itself that yields the lack of convergence to q∗.
Rather, a lack of convergence to q∗ seems to arise in settings for which the low
value is very close to zero. If the low value is not “very low”, then there is still
convergence to q∗. For instance, if α = 4, then the optimal solution is “one high,
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others low”, with q∗H = 0.8546 and q
∗
L = 9× 10−4, but as can be seen in the table,
there is convergence to q∗ from q0 = 0 as well as from all 1000 random initial
conditions.
Based upon the observation in the preceding paragraph, if α is large enough
that the low value in q∗ is very small, then the seller may simply stop offering
an assortment of n products and instead offer only the one product with the high
value in q∗. Since the low value in q∗ is very small, the revenue loss from dropping
those products entirely would be negligible. In this case, the seller would simply
solve a single-product pricing problem (n = 1) in hope that the single-product
problem is such that the optimal (single) price p(q∗) yields a unique equilibrium
quantity or at least there is convergence to q∗ starting from a larger set of initial
conditions.
In the rows of Table 2.1 labeled n = 1, we examine this idea. We again consider
the convergence of qt to q∗ (for the n = 1 case) starting from either 0 or a random
initial value selected uniformly on [0, 1]. Then we compute the optimal revenue
π∗1 = p(q
∗)q∗. From Table 2.1, we can see that the optimal revenue from selling
only one product is very close to that from selling all five products when α ≥ 4.
Moreover, the convergence behavior is better when n = 1 than when n = 5.
Even though the issue of multiple equilibria still exists, the chance of convergence
starting from a random point is markedly greater when n = 1 than when n = 5.
For example, when α = 5, we have the desired convergence from 64% of initial
points when n = 1 compared to 11.8% when n = 5.
We close this section by noting that the issue of multiple equilibria is common
in problems involving network effects (see Appendix 4.2 for references) and more
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generally in problems involving strategic agents. As we note in the appendix,
there is no single “right” answer for what to do when multiple equilibria are
present. Our analysis covers many settings in which the equilibrium is unique.
If there are multiple equilibria, it is possible that a suboptimal equilibrium has
very poor performance compared to the optimal one, as we showed earlier in the
α = 7 case (π′ = 0.1287 versus π∗ = 5.5178). To avoid such an unsatisfactory
result, the seller can implement prices p(q∗) and announce the anticipated sales
vector q∗. If the customers believe the seller’s announcement, then the sales will
actually be q∗. If the customers believe that the sales will be in a neighborhood
of q∗ then adjustments as described above will lead sales to q∗. (As shown above,
the neighborhood can be large and even include all possible initial conditions,
or it can be small.) If the seller is concerned that some equilibrium other than
q
∗ may prevail when prices p(q∗) are implemented, then that seller may wish to
consider a different formulation than (P0). For example, if a seller is particularly
pessimistic or sensitive to potential negative outcomes, it may wish to instead
maximize
∑n
i=1 piq
LR
i (p) over p where q
LR(p) = (qLR1 (p), . . . , q
LR
n (p)) is the vector
of quantities that yields the lowest revenue among those q that satisfy (2.4) for
prices p. This idea is addressed in Chapter 3.
2.6.2 Importance of Considering Network Effects
In this section, we demonstrate that if products do indeed exhibit network effects,
then it is important to take that into account when making pricing decisions.
Otherwise, a significant portion of the optimal revenue may be lost. We also
show that it is important to consider the possibility of setting different prices for
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different products even in the case of homogeneous products (recall that optimal
prices for homogeneous products will be identical in the absence of network
effects).
We start our tests by considering the homogeneous case. In our experiments,
we fix n = 5, y = 2, and γ = 1. We assume that the network effect parameter
α ranges from 0 to 5. For each value of the true α, we consider three pricing
strategies:
1. We solve problem (P1) and obtain the optimal sales levels q∗. Then we use
price vector p∗ = p(q∗), which gives revenue π(q∗) =
∑n
i=1 p
∗
i q
∗
i .
2. We consider the optimal symmetric solution. That is, we impose an
additional constraint that q1 = · · · = qn in (P1). Let the optimal solution to
this problem be qu and the corresponding price be pu = p(qu). The revenue
is πu =
∑n
i=1 p
u
i q
u
i .
3. We ignore the network effect by solving (P1) with α = 0. Let q◦ denote
the optimal solution, and let p◦(q) denote (2.7) with α = 0. We compute
prices p◦ = p◦(q◦). Note that q◦ will not be an equilibrium for these prices
(except when α is actually 0) because the equilibrium condition (2.4) uses
the actual value of α. If there are multiple sales vectors q that satisfy the
equilibrium condition for prices p◦, then in our comparison we select the one
(which we will call q¯◦) that achieves the highest revenue in order to give the
method of ignoring network effects the “benefit of doubt”. We denote the
corresponding revenue of this price by π◦ =
∑n
i=1 p
◦
i q¯
◦
i .
Note that the price vector in Case 3 is the optimal price vector for the classical
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MNL model without network effects (which is a uniform price across all products
in this homogeneous case). We summarize the results in Table 2.2. In the table,
ℓu represents the percentage of the revenue π(q∗) that is lost if we use prices pu.
Similarly, ℓ◦ is the percentage lost if we use prices p◦.
α 0 1 2 3 4 5
π(q∗) 1.9445 2.0343 2.1295 2.4413 3.1209 3.8807
πu 1.9445 2.0343 2.1295 2.2299 2.3353 2.4456
ℓu 0% 0% 0% 8.66% 25.17% 36.98%
π◦ 1.9445 2.0336 2.1255 2.2185 2.3103 2.3984
ℓ◦ 0% 0.04% 0.19% 9.12% 25.97% 38.20%
Table 2.2: Comparison of revenues for different pricing decisions.
From Table 2.2, we see that when α ≤ 2, the optimal pricing strategy is to
set uniform prices across all products; therefore, the revenue in Case 2 is identical
to that in Case 1. When α ≥ 3, a uniform pricing strategy is no longer optimal
and Case 1 generates a higher revenue than does Case 2. Moreover, for strictly
positive α, the revenue in Case 3 is smaller than the optimal revenue, and the
difference becomes larger when α increases.
Next we do the same test with heterogeneous parameters. In the following
experiments, we consider problems with n ranging from 2 to 20. For each n,
we generate 1000 different sets of parameters to obtain 1000 randomly generated
problem instances. We apply Algorithm 1 to solve each problem instance. To
generate an instance, we sample αi, yi and γi from uniform distributions over
[0, 4], [1, 2] and [0, 2], respectively. We consider only Cases 1 and 3 because a
uniform pricing strategy is not optimal — even when there are no network effects
— in this heterogeneous setting. The results are summarized in Table 2.3, where
ℓ¯◦ denotes the percentage loss from ignoring network effects, averaged over the
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1000 instances.
n 2 3 5 10 15 20
T¯ (secs.) 4.00 4.23 4.68 5.24 5.89 6.34
ℓ¯◦ 10.31% 12.30% 13.03% 13.82% 12.45% 11.47%
Table 2.3: Comparison of revenues in heterogeneous settings
In Table 2.3, we can observe that the loss from ignoring network effects is
considerable for each n. In the row labeled T¯ , we show the average run-time
(in seconds) of Algorithm 1 on a Mac desktop computer with a 2.7 GHz Intel
Quad-Core i5 processor and 8 GB of memory. We see that Algorithm 1 can be
carried out very quickly, even with large values of n. As n increases from 2 to 20,
the average running time experiences a modest increase from about four seconds
to about six seconds.
2.6.3 Robustness of the Solution
In this section, we test the robustness of the solution to (P1) with respect to
estimation errors of the network strength parameters. For simplicity, we confine
our attention to problems with homogeneous products. Suppose that the seller
believes the network strength parameter is α˜ (this may be viewed as the seller’s
estimate) and solves (P1) with α˜ in place of α. This yields solution q˜. Then, using
(2.7) with α˜ in place of α, the seller obtains prices p˜(q˜). What happens if the
seller implements those prices when the network strength parameter upon which
customers base their purchase decisions is actually α rather than α˜? (Note that
by the discussion after (2.3), our test can also be viewed as a test for robustness
of the solution with respect to the estimation errors of the market size M .)
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To test this, we fix n = 5, y = 2, and γ = 1. In this setting, the threshold from
Theorem 2.3.1 at which the actual optimal policy switches from uniform pricing
to two different prices is αˆ = 2.513. We consider two different true values for
the network strength parameter, α = 2.4 and α = 2.6. Note that one of these
is below the threshold and one is above. In these cases, there is no issue with
multiple equilibria at prices p∗ or p˜(q˜). Let q′ denote the resulting equilibrium
sales vector when the seller implements prices p˜(q˜) in the problem that has actual
network parameter α. Note that q′ 6= q˜ when α˜ 6= α. On the other hand, if
α˜ = α, then the seller does not make an estimation error and therefore q′ = q˜.
Let π˜ =
∑5
i=1 p˜i(q˜)q
′
i be seller’s revenue from implementing prices p˜(q˜) and let
ℓ˜ be the percentage revenue loss in comparison to the optimal solution (without
estimation errors); i.e., ℓ˜ = 100 × (π(q∗) − π˜)/π(q∗). Results are summarized in
Table 2.4.
α˜ 2 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 3
p˜(q˜)
pH 3.0496 3.0614 3.0645 4.4127 4.8514 5.2434
pL 3.0496 3.0614 3.0645 2.6694 2.7966 2.9269
α = 2.4
π˜ 2.1689 2.1690 2.1690 2.1226 2.0779 1.9943
ℓ˜ 0.01% < 0.01% 0% 2.14% 4.20% 8.05%
α = 2.6
π˜ 2.1886 2.1889 2.1889 2.2199 2.2046 2.1505
ℓ˜ 1.41% 1.40% 1.39% 0% 0.69% 3.13%
Table 2.4: Sensitivity to errors in estimates of α
As the table shows, the optimal strategy is to price equally if the true network
parameter is α = 2.4. If α is underestimated (columns to the left of the column
labeled 2.4 in the row labeled 2.4), then the strategy is still to price equally, and
the revenue loss from underestimating α is negligible. This occurs because the
optimal price is quite insensitive to α in this case, as can be seen (for different
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examples) in Figure 2.3, which shows prices as “nearly” constant in the region
where a single price is optimal. When α is overestimated (columns to the right
of the column labeled 2.4 in the row labeled 2.4), then the resulting strategy is
to price differently and the revenue loss is comparatively more sensitive to the
estimation error. We should not be surprised to see a relatively large (roughly
8%) loss in the column for α˜ = 3 because in that case the estimate of the network
strength parameter differs from the true value of α = 2.4 by 25%. If the true
network parameter is α = 2.6, then it is above the threshold αˆ, and therefore the
optimal strategy has two distinct prices. When the estimate α˜ is below αˆ, the
revenue loss is quite insensitive to α˜ due to the insensitivity of the optimal price
in that range. When α is overestimated, the revenue loss is also low as long as
the estimation error is reasonable.
2.7 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we considered pricing problems faced by a seller whose products
exhibit network effects. For a setting with a homogeneous assortment of products,
we established that the optimal solution has the following form: if the network
effects are weak, then the seller should set the same price for all products; if
the network effects are strong, then the seller should boost the sales of a single
product by setting its price low and setting the prices of all other products at
a single higher value. We also provided comparative statics and extended our
results to nonhomogeneous settings. In view of the particularly clean structure
that arises from our model, we are optimistic that the results in this chapter can
serve as a building block for much future research.
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There are, of course, limitations to our model. One simple example is
our underlying assumption that customers each buy at most one product. As
a practical matter, it is natural to expect that some customers may wish to
buy more than one product. A possibly more complex issue is that in our
current formulation, purchase probabilities satisfy the equilibrium condition (2.4),
which means that customers have rational expectations about market outcomes.
However, it may be that customers behave in a more myopic fashion. For example,
for a single instance of the pricing problem, sales may build dynamically over time
and customers may make purchase decisions based on current cumulative sales
levels of the products. Such sequential myopic decision making may lead to an
outcome that does not satisfy (2.4). This also in turn raises the possibility of the
seller responding to such behavior by adjusting prices over time to gain higher
revenue. These issues may be the topic of future work.
Chapter 3
Multiplicity of Equilibria and
Worst-Case Pricing
3.1 Introduction
In last chapter, we showed that multiple equilibria could arise in the multinomial
logit model with network effects. More precisely, for a fixed pricing decision, there
could be multiple sales quantities that satisfy the equilibrium condition. In the
previous discussions, when such a situation happens, we optimistically assumed
that the sales quantity that leads to the highest (best-case) revenue would prevail.
Yet in practice, this may not necessarily be the case.
To address this issue of multiple equilibria, in this chapter, we study the pricing
problem from a robust perspective. Specifically, if there are multiple equilibria of
sales quantities to a pricing decision, we take a conservative attitude and assume
that the resulting equilibrium is the one that leads to the lowest (worst-case)
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revenue. We call this the “worst-case problem” and the optimal solution the
pessimistic solution.
We first consider the single-product case. We show that if the network effect is
weak, there is no issue of such multiple equilibria and the optimistic solution and
the pessimistic solution are equivalent; if the network effect is strong, the multiple
equilibria issue arises but we can still solve the worst-case problem efficiently.
Particularly, we show that the optimal price in the pessimistic case would be
lower than that in the optimistic case, which means that the firm should be more
conservative with its pricing policy. We also show that as the network effect
increases, both product sales and revenue will increase accordingly. In addition,
the potential loss from assuming optimism on the realized sales could be significant
if the actual sales quantity is the pessimistic one, especially when the network
effect is strong.
We next study the two-product case. When the firm has two products to
sell, there are many possibilities for the total number of equilibria for a fixed pair
of prices. The equilibrium condition becomes much more complicated and it is
difficult to derive analytical solutions to the worst-case problem. To numerically
solve this problem, we propose two methods to compute the pessimistic optimal
solution: divide and search, and linear relaxation. Numerical experiments suggest
that at the pessimistic optimal prices, there is always only one equilibrium of sales
quantities. In addition, we find that when the network effect is strong, the revenue
from offering just one product is almost as good as that from selling a portfolio of
multiple products. This suggests that a company selling multiple products with
strong network effects may be wise to simply offer a single product.
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3.2 The General Model
The model settings are the same as in Chapter 2. A single seller offers n products,
labeled as i ∈ N = {1, · · · , n}, to the customers. Each individual customer in
the market chooses at most one product among them, or could also choose not to
buy, in which case we label this “no purchase” option as product 0. The utility a
customer obtains from purchasing product i is
ui = vi + ǫi, (3.1)
where vi is the expected utility from purchasing product i and ǫi is a random
variable that represents customer-specific idiosyncracies. For the no purchase
option, without loss of generality, we let v0 = 0. As in the standard MNL model,
we assume ǫ0, ǫ1, · · · , ǫn are i.i.d. Gumbel random variables. By incorporating the
network effects, each vi includes a network effect term that reflects an individual’s
additional utility from others’ usage of product i. More precisely, for i ∈ N , we
have
vi = yi − pi + αiqi (3.2)
where yi ≥ 0 is the intrinsic utility of product i, pi is the price, αi is the network
effect sensitivity parameter, and qi is the sales quantity. The parameter αi
represents the strength of network effects for product i, and a higher value of
αi indicates that the consumers of product i are more sensitive to others’ usage
of that product. As in Chapter 2, we consider a fluid model of “infinitesimal”
customers with the market size normalized to 1. Consequently, the sales quantity
qi can also be interpreted as the probability that an individual customer will
purchase product i.
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By standard results for the MNL model, if we are given sales quantities q =
(q1, . . . , qn) and prices p = (p1, . . . , pn), then the probability that a customer
purchases product i ∈ N is
qi = P (ui = maxj∈{0,1,...,n}uj) =
exp(yi − pi + αiqi)
1 +
∑n
j=1 exp(yj − pj + αjqj)
. (3.3)
Upon defining
Fi(p, q) =
exp(yi − pi + αiqi)
1 +
∑n
j=1 exp(yj − pj + αjqj)
, (3.4)
we may re-write (3.3) as
qi = Fi(p, q) for all i ∈ N . (3.5)
The goal of the seller is to select prices that maximize its total revenue
π(p, q) = pTq subject to the equilibrium constraints (3.3). The seller implements
prices p, and the market responds with quantities q that satisfy (3.3). For a
given vector of prices p, there may exist multiple sales vectors that satisfy (3.3)
and these sales vectors are associated with different revenues. In Chapter 2, we
implicitly took an optimistic attitude that for any prices p, the sales vector that
arises is the one with the highest revenue among those satisfying (3.3). Here, we
seek to better understand the effects of non-unique sales equilibria by studying
the “worst-case” problem assuming that for any prices p, the sales vector that
arises is the one with the lowest revenue among those satisfying (3.3).
Define F (p, q) = (F1(p, q), . . . , Fn(p, q)). For any vector of prices p, define
Q(p) to be the set containing all q that satisfy (3.5), that is, Q(p) = {q ∈
[0, 1]n : q = F (p, q)}. We can now formulate the best-case and worst-case pricing
problems.
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The best-case pricing problem is
π = sup
p
π(p)
π(p) = max
q
{π(p, q) : q ∈ Q(p)} .
(BC)
Likewise, the worst-case pricing problem is
π = sup
p
π(p)
π(p) = min
q
{π(p, q) : q ∈ Q(p)} .
(WC)
Lemma ?? in the appendix establishes that Q(p) is a compact set. Moreover,
for given p, the function π(p, q) is continuous in q and therefore π(p) and π(p)
both exist. As we will see later, π(p) may be discontinuous in p, and therefore
there may be no optimal solution to sup
p
π(p) in (WC). In such cases, we will
settle on an ǫ-optimal solution pǫ wherein π(pǫ) > sup
p
π(p)−ǫ. Such an ǫ-optimal
solution exists for any ǫ > 0.
3.3 Single-Product Case
In this section, we consider the scenario that there is only one product. The
problem is to set a price to maximize the total revenue from selling this product.
Throughout this section, we will drop the subscripts from the notations because
such subscripts are unnecessary when there is only one product. As in (3.2), the
expected utility a customer obtains from purchasing the product for a given price
p is u = y − p+ α, and the sales quantity q in equilibrium satisfies
q = F (p, q) :=
exp(y − p+ αq)
1 + exp(y − p+ αq) . (3.6)
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We begin by describing an approach from Du et al. (2016) to solve the
best-case version of this problem. This is the approach from Chapter 2, specialized
to a setting with one product (n = 1). By transforming (3.6), price p can be
written as
p(q) = y + αq − log q + log(1− q). (3.7)
For any given q ∈ (0, 1), simple algebra shows that p = p(q) is the unique price
for which (3.6) holds. [Note, however, this does not preclude the possibility that
there is some other value of sales (say q′) such that p(q) and q′ also together satisfy
(3.6).] For n = 1, if q ∈ (0, 1) then we have that q ∈ Q(p) if and only if p(q) = p.
Define
π˜(q) = p(q)q = yq + αq2 − q log(q) + q log(1− q), (3.8)
and consider the maximization problem
π˜∗ = max
q
{π˜(q) : 0 < q < 1} . (P0)
We now have that
π = sup
p
max
q
{pq : q ∈ Q(p)} = sup
p
max
q∈(0,1)
{pq : p(q) = p} = max
q∈(0,1)
{p(q)q} = π˜∗
and we can summarize our developments so far with the following result.
Lemma 3.3.1. For n = 1, the best-case problem (BC) is equivalent to (P0); i.e.,
π = π˜∗ and a pair (p, q) is an optimal solution to (BC) if and only if q is an
optimal solution to (P0) and p(q) = p.
Given an optimal solution (p, q) to the best-case problem (BC), what might
happen if the seller implements the price p? In particular, what value of sales
quantity other than q might arise? In Figure 3.1, we present an illustrative
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example. Figure 3.1 plots the function p(q) defined in (3.7). Note that the
(p, q)-pairs that satisfy (3.6) are simply the points in two-dimensional space that
fall on the plot of p(q). Therefore, we can determine the number of equilibria for a
given price p by counting the number of times a horizontal line at p intersects the
curve of p(q). Figure 3.1 shows that if the price p is such that p ∈ (pL, pH), then
there are three different q satisfying (3.7). Therefore, if p falls into this range, then
the sales could have three possible values. By imposing an optimistic attitude, we
assume that the actual sales level q is the largest one among these three values.
If, contrary to the optimistic assumption, the actual sales level q turns out to be
the smallest value (which is consistent with the pessimistic assumption), then the
sales — as well as the revenue — would be much lower than that in the optimistic
assumption. For example, in Figure 3.1(b), when the implemented price is p′ = 4,
then the largest sales quantity in equilibrium would be around 0.929, while the
smallest sales would be slightly above 0.07. Thus there is a drastic difference
between these two realizations of sales quantities. The following lemma describes
the structure of the function p(q) and is essential for understanding when multiple
sales equilibria do and do not arise.
Lemma 3.3.2. For n = 1, the equilibrium condition has the following properties.
1) Suppose α ≤ 4. The function p(q) defined in (3.7) is a strictly decreasing
function. For each p > 0, there is a unique q such that (p, q) satisfies (3.6).
2) Suppose α > 4. The function p(q) has a unique local minimum and a unique
local maximum at respectively, qL = 1/2 −√1/4− 1/α and qH = 1/2 +√
1/4− 1/α. In addition, for pL := p(qL) and pH := p(qH) we have the
following:
61
quantity
0 0.5 1
p
ri
ce
2
4
6
pH
pL
qHq
L
qM
(a) Plot of function p(q) for parameter values α =
6, y = 1.
quantity
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
p
ri
ce
2
4
6
q1 q3q2
p′
(b) An example of three equilibria
Figure 3.1: Plot of function p(q)
(a) For each p ∈ (pL, pH), there are three distinct q such that (p, q) satisfies
(3.6);
(b) for each p ∈ {pL, pH}, there are two distinct q such that (p, q) satisfies
(3.6);
(c) for each p 6∈ [pL, pH ], there is a unique q such that (p, q) satisfies (3.6).
Below, we use qM to denote the larger one of the two sales quantities for which
(pL, q) satisfies (3.6). We have qM > qL and p(qM) = pL(see Figure 3.1).
Lemma 3.3.2 indicates that, in single product scenario the issue of multiple
equilibria arises only when the network effect is strong enough (α > 4). When
the product exhibits weak network effects, the problems (BC) and (WC) are
equivalent, because there is a unique sales equilibrium to every price. Because of
this, in the remainder of this section, we focus on the setting with strong network
effects (α > 4). Here, it is obvious that if the optimal price (resp., sales quantity)
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in (BC) is less than pL (resp., greater than qM), then (BC) and (WC) have the
same optimal solution. To further understand the relationship between (BC) and
(WC), we present the following result.
Lemma 3.3.3. Suppose α > 4. Then π˜(q) is a unimodal function and has a
unique local and global maximum point on q˜ ∈ (0, 1). The point q˜ satisfies the
first order condition
π˜′(q) = y + 2αq − log(q) + log(1− q)− 1
1− q = 0. (3.9)
In addition, q˜ > qH and q˜ increases in α.
By Lemma 3.3.3, there is a unique solution q˜ to (P0) and therefore (BC) can
be computed efficiently using a standard root-finding algorithm, for example, the
Newton’s method. Consider now the following optimization problem
π˜◦ = max
q
{π˜(q) : qM ≤ q < 1}, (P1)
which can be viewed as a tighter version of (P0).
Define the optimal solution to (P1) as q◦, and the corresponding price as
p◦ = p(q◦). Similarly, there is a unique optimal solution to (P1), because π˜(q) is
unimodal. In addition, we have the following result.
Lemma 3.3.4. Suppose α > 4. For n = 1, the worst-case problem (WC) can be
solved using (P1); i.e., π = π˜◦. In addition:
1) If q◦ > qM , then there exists an optimal solution (p, q) to (WC) and p = p◦
and q = q◦;
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2) If q◦ = qM , then there is no optimal solution to (WC), and for any ǫ > 0,
(pǫ, qǫ) := (p◦− ǫ, q◦+ δ(ǫ)) = (pL− ǫ, qM + δ(ǫ)) is an ǫ-optimal solution to
(WC), where δ(ǫ) is the unique solution to p(qM + δ) = pL − ǫ.
The preceding results reveal, via (P0) and (P1), a simple relationship between
(BC) and (WC): solving for the pessimistic case is almost equivalent to solving
for the optimistic case on a restricted domain. Lemma 3.3.4 also implies that the
optimal sales quantity q must be higher than qM , therefore the optimal price p◦
must be lower than pL. Therefore, an optimal worst-case quantity can lie only
in the region q ∈ [qM , 1). Lemma 3.3.4 also states that even if the worst case
problem (WC) has no optimal solution, the seller should set the price at a level
just below p◦. To simplify our notations, we let p = p◦ from now on.
Based on Lemmas 3.3.3 and 3.3.4, the following theorem compares the
solutions to the two settings based on different grounds.
Theorem 3.3.5. The optimal solution p to Problem (BC) and the optimal
solution p to Problem (WC) satisfy:
1) If q˜ > qM , then q = q, p = p, and π = π;
2) If q˜ ≤ qM , (WC) has no optimal solution but for any ǫ > 0, (pǫ, qǫ) is an
ǫ-optimal solution to (WC), and it satisfies q < qǫ, p > pǫ, and π > pǫqǫ.
Here q˜ is the unique maximum point of π˜(q), and qM is the larger solution to
p(qM) = pL.
Theorem 3.3.5 gives an explicit relationship between the optimal price decisions
based on two beliefs: the optimistic price should always be higher than the
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pessimistic price. When q˜ > qM , they have the same price decision. Therefore,
we do not need to be concerned about the issue of multiple equilibria. However,
when q˜ ≤ qM , the firm should implement a price lower than the optimistic optimal
price to eliminate the risk that a sales equilibrium arises at a value lower than
expected. The following algorithm solves Problem (WC).
Algorithm 3. 1. Solve for q˜ by solving the equation π˜′(q) = y+2αq− log(q)+
log(1− q)− 1
1−q = 0 over [1/2 +
√
1/4− 1/α, 1] through bisection method.
2. Solve for qM by solving the equation p(qL) = y + αq − log(q) + log(1 − q)
over [1/2 +
√
1/4− 1/α, 1] through bisection method.
3. Compare q˜ with qM to obtain q = max(q˜, qM).
Theorem 3.3.6. q and π increase in α.
Theorem 3.3.6 says that as network effects become stronger, the seller should
sell more products to achieve a higher revenue. This property is similar to the
optimistic case, therefore the seller should always boost sales when it observes a
stronger network effect, no matter which belief he holds.
From the view of the seller, it is useful to know the loss they would suffer from
implementing the “optimal” optimistic price when the realized sales quantity is
actually the pessimistic one. More specifically, the seller would like to know that
in the pessimistic condition, what is the difference in revenue from using the
optimistic optimal price p to using the pessimistic optimal price p. By Theorem
3.3.5, these two revenues differ only when q˜ < qM . Even though p does not exist,
a pessimistic seller can adopt the price pL − ǫ. This is an ǫ-optimal solution that
always leads to a unique revenue. In contrast, an optimistic seller implementing
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price p = p(q) could lead to three different sales quantities according to our
model, and the realized one may not be the highest one. Suppose the smallest
sales quantity corresponding to price p is denoted as qS. We would like to compare
the revenue πS = pqS with π = pLqM . π is the total revenue a pessimistic seller
would earn when the realized sales is indeed in the worst case, while πS is the
total revenue an optimistic seller would earn when the realized sales counters its
wish. We have the following results about πS and π.
Theorem 3.3.7. 1) If q˜ > qM , then πS = π.
2) If q˜ ≤ qM , then πS
π
≤ qL
qH
=
1/2−
√
1/4−1/α
1/2+
√
1/4−1/α . Furthermore, π − π
S ≥ pL(qM −
qL), and pL(qM − qL) increases in α.
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Figure 3.2: Illustration of Theorem 3.3.7
From Theorem 3.3.7, the potential loss from assuming optimism on the realized
sales could be significant, especially in the presence of a strong network effect. In
Figure 3.2, it can be observed that there exists a discontinuity in πS as well as
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in π
S
π
, when α exceeds a threshold value. This is due to the multiple equilibria
from implementing the optimal price p. We also observe that the issue of multiple
equilibria aggravates the loss of revenue for higher values of α. Therefore, a
company selling a product with stronger network effect has more incentives to
take a pessimistic attitude and implement a conservative pricing policy.
3.4 Two-Product Case
In this section, we study the scenario that a seller offers two products with network
effects to the market. The two products have intrinsic utilities y1, y2 with network
effect sensitivities α1, α2. For simplicity, we assume y1 = y2 = 0. Suppose the
prices of those two products are set to p = (p1, p2), the sales quantities must
satisfy
q1 =
e−p1+α1q1
1 + e−p1+α1q1 + e−p2+α2q2
, q2 =
e−p2+α2q2
1 + e−p1+α1q1 + e−p2+α2q2
.
The above equations follow directly from (3.3). For the convenience of analysis,
we rewrite the two equations into a system of two closed-form functions in terms
of q1, q2
q1 = 1− q2 − q2ep2−α2q2, q2 = 1− q1 − q1ep1−α1q1. (3.10)
Define fi(qi|pi, αi) := 1 − qi − qiepi−αiqi, the two equations in (3.10) can be
represented as q2 = f1(q1|p1, α1) and q1 = f2(q2|p2, α2). The structure of f1, f2
shows that the sales quantities q1, q2 are determined not only by pricing decisions
(p1, p2), but also by themselves.
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With the above knowledge, the problem is to find the pessimistic optimal
pricing decision p that maximizes the total revenues π(p) in the worst-case
π(p) = min
q
{π(p, q) = p1q1 + p2q2|(q1, q2) = q ∈ Q(p)} ,
where Q(p) is the set of all q satisfying (3.10).
The two-product (WC) problem is not as easily solvable as the one-product
(WC) problem. In the one-product scenario, the equilibrium condition (3.7) is a
one-variable function p(q) with a simpler analytic structure, which allows us to
easily identify the worst-case sales q for any price p. In addition, the unimodularity
property of function π˜(q) enables us to apply a standard root-finding algorithm on
q to find the optimistic optimal solution q˜, and then we can solve the pessimistic
problem by comparing q˜ with qM . However, in the two-product scenario, the
equilibrium condition consists of two functions f1(·), f2(·) with two variables q1, q2.
The extra equation and variable impose more complexity to the system, and
the structure of the worst-case equilibrium is not straightforward to characterize.
In fact, even if prices p = (p1, p2) are known, the total number of equilibria
may not be easy to analyze. For example, Figure 3.3 plots the equation system
q2 = f1(q1|p1, α1), q1 = f2(q2|p2, α2) where p1 = 4, p2 = 2.8, α1 = 14, α2 = 8. The
equilibria are the points in two-dimensional space where the two curves (the solid
lines) intersect. (The dashed lines in the figure will be explained later.) In this
particular example, there exist a total number of 5 equilibria. In general, there
does not appear to be a straightforward way to compute all equilibria. Thus in
order to find the pessimistic optimal prices, we have to search over all the price
combinations.
In the following discussions, we propose two different directions for finding
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Figure 3.3: Example with p1 = 4, p2 = 2.8, α1 = 14, α2 = 8
the pessimistic solution q for a given pair of prices p = (p1, p2). The first idea
is to divide the feasible two-dimensional domain into smaller regions where the
equilibrium functions (3.10) in each region remain monotone. The monotonicity
structure enables us to apply bisection algorithm in each region separately and
then find all the equilibria. Another method we propose is to formulate a linear
relaxation problem for the original one and find a lower bound of the pessimistic
solution q. We elaborate the two ideas in the next two subsections.
3.4.1 Divide and Search
In this subsection, we discuss the idea of dividing and searching for all the
equilibria to (3.10) for a given pair of prices p = (p1, p2). We take advantage
of the structure of the equilibrium functions, and divide the feasible domain into
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smaller regions. In each region, we exploit the properties of functions therein and
apply appropriate algorithms to compute the equilibria contained in that region.
First, we explain the basic reasoning of dividing the two-dimension domain.
Note that all the feasible equilibria in Q(p) are contained in [0, 1]2. For a
sub-region R ⊆ [0, 1]2, define πR(p) as the worst-case revenue from implementing
p with sales quantities restricted in R, i.e.
πR(p) = min
q
{π(p, q) : q ∈ {Q(p) ∩ R}} . (3.11)
Then we have
Proposition 3.4.1. If regions R1, · · · ,RN ⊆ [0, 1]2 are such that
⋃
i=1,··· ,N Ri =
[0, 1]2, then
π(p) = min
i=1,··· ,N
πRi(p).
Proposition 3.4.1 says that the worst equilibrium in [0, 1]2 can be found by
comparing the worst ones within each sub-region. Then a question remains on
how to divide the feasible region in a useful way. A natural idea is to divide it
such that in functions (3.10) the equilibrium conditions are monotone within each
region. The following lemma provides a guidance to do that.
Lemma 3.4.2. The function f(q) = 1 − q − qep−αq satisfies the following
properties:
1) f(q) is convex on q ∈ (0, 2/α), and concave on q ∈ (2/α, 1);
2) f ′(q) = 0 has at most two solutions;
3) f(0) = 1, f(1) < 0 and f(q) = 0 has at most three solutions.
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By Lemma 3.4.2, f ′i(q) = 0 has at most two solutions, therefore qi can be
separated into three monotone regions by the two solutions of f ′i(q) = 0. There
are two variables q1, q2 in the two-product case and f1(q1), f2(q2) are cut along
the q1, q2 axes respectively. Therefore, there are at most 9 regions to study. The
dashed lines in Figure 3.3 illustrates an example of dividing the domain [0, 1]2 into
9 regions. (Note that f ′(q) = 0 may have only one or even no solution by Lemma
3.4.2, and in that case we separate it into two regions at the point f ′′(q) = 0.)
In each region, f1(·), f2(·) are monotone functions and this structure enables us
to apply efficient algorithms on them to quickly find all the equilibria. Define
g(q) = f1(q)− f−12 (q), then any equilibrium must satisfy g(q) = 0. The following
proposition elaborates the results.
Proposition 3.4.3. For i = 1, 2, suppose f ′i(qi) = 0 has two different solutions
qai , q
b
i and q
a
i < q
b
i . The feasible domain q1 ∈ [0, 1] is divided into three intervals
I1 = [0, qa1 ], I2 = (qa1 , qb1] and I3 = (qb1, 1], and q2 ∈ [0, 1] is divided into three
intervals J1 = [0, qa2 ],J2 = (qa2 , qb2] and J3 = (qb2, 1]. Therefore the domain of
q ∈ [0, 1]2 can be divided into 9 regions. Table 3.1 shows the maximum number of
equilibria in each region. Within each region, Algorithm 4 is applied to compute
all the equilibria efficiently.
J3 2 1 1
J2 1 1© 1
J1 1© 1 2
I1 I2 I3
Table 3.1: Maximum number of equilibria in each region
Algorithm 4. 1. For cells in which there is at most 1 equilibrium:
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(a) Find the feasible lower bound and upper bound [xL, xU ];
(b) Evaluate g(xL) and g(xU). If they have opposite signs, then apply
bisection method to g(x) over [xL, xU ].
2. For cells in which there are at most 2 equilibria:
(a) Find the feasible lower bound and upper bound [xL, xU ];
(b) Evaluate g(xL) and g(xU), if they have opposite signs, apply bisection
method to g(x) over [xL, xU ];
(c) If g(xL) and g(xU) have the same sign, search for the unique local
maxima or minima xM . If xM exists and g(xM) has opposite signs
with g(xL), g(xU), then apply bisection method to g(x) over [xL, xM ]
and [xM , xU ] separately;
On the two regions [I1 × J1] and [I2 × J2], we circle the number in Table
3.1 to indicate that we are unable to prove the maximum number of equilibria.
However, in our extensive numerical experiments, we find that there is at most 1
equilibrium in each region. Therefore Algorithm 4 works well for finding all the
equilibria in practice.
3.4.2 Linear Relaxation
In this subsection, instead of computing all the equilibria exactly, we aim to
compute a lower bound on πR(p). The approach is based on an idea proposed
by Yamamura and Fujioka (2003) for finding all solutions of systems of nonlinear
equations. One of their main ideas is to identify regions without any solution by
checking (in)feasibility of a linear program.
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Suppose q = (q1, q2) is restricted on one region R = [L1, U1] × [L2, U2] ∈
[0, 1]2, then the pessimistic optimization problem on the bounded region can be
formulated
πR(p) = min
q
π(p, q)
s.t. qie
pi−αqi + q1 + q2 − 1 = 0,
Li ≤ qi ≤ Ui.
(PES-bd)
For our purposes below, we will be interested only in two choices [Li, Ui] ⊆
[0, 2/α] or [Li, Ui] ⊆ [2/α, ri], where ri = qbi is defined in Proposition 3.4.3. Define
hi(qi) := qie
pi−αqi and formulate the following linear problem as a relaxation of
Problem (PES-bd).
ρR(p) = min
q
π(p, q)
s.t. yi + q1 + q2 − 1 = 0, i = 1, 2
Li ≤ qi ≤ Ui, i = 1, 2
yi ≥ Aki , i = 1, 2 and all k
yi ≤ Bki , i = 1, 2 and all k
(LN)
where
1) if [Li, Ui] ⊆ [0, 2/α], then A1i = hi(Li)+ hi(Ui)−hi(Li)Ui−Li (qi−Li), B1i = h′i(Li)qi+
hi(Li)− h′i(Li)Li, B2i = h′i(Ui)qi + hi(Ui)− h′i(Ui)Ui and B3i = hi(1/α).
2) if [Li, Ui] ⊆ [2/α, ri], then A1i = h′i(Ui)qi+hi(Ui)−h′i(Ui)Ui, A2i = h′i(Li)qi+
hi(Li)− h′i(Li)Li and B1i = hi(Li) + hi(Ui)−hi(Li)Ui−Li (qi − Li).
The idea using Problem (LN) as a relaxation of Problem (PES-bd) is illustrated
in Figure 3.4. In this example, α = 5. In Problem (LN), a set of new variables
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yi are added to substitute the nonlinear terms hi(qi) in Problem (PES-bd). On
the interval qi ∈ [0, 2/α], function hi(qi) is concave as shown in Figure 3.4(a),
thus bounded within the polygon formed by A1i , B
1
i , B
2
i , and B
3
i . On the
interval qi ∈ [2/α, 1], function hi(qi) is convex as shown in Figure 3.4(b), and
thus bounded within the polygon formed by A1i , A
2
i , and B
1
i . Therefore, all
the points satisfying the constraints in Problem (PES-bd) must also satisfy the
constraints in Problem (LN). The following lemma summarizes the relationship
between Problem (PES-bd) and (LN).
Proposition 3.4.4. Given fixed prices p = (p1, p2) and region R = [L1, U1] ×
[L2, U2], Problem (LN) is a linear relaxation of Problem (PES-bd) and
(I) If Problem (LN) is infeasible, then Problem (PES-bd) is also infeasible, and
therefore there is no equilibrium on R.
(II) If Problem (LN) has an optimal value ρR(p), then either (i.) Problem
(PES-bd) is infeasible, or (ii.) Problem (PES-bd) is feasible and πR(p) ≥
ρR(p).
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Figure 3.4: Illustration of relaxation
By Proposition 3.4.4, for a given region R, solving problem (LN) gives us
a lower bound of the optimal objective value πR(p) to problem (PES-bd). To
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derive a tighter value of ρR(p) to πR(p), we can further restrict the initial domain
R to a smaller region which contains all equilibria. The idea is to change the
objective function in (LN), from minimizing the total revenue to a new objective
function of maximizing/minimize qi, while keeping all constraints the same as in
(LN). Namely, given the initial bounds R = [Li, Ui]2, we formulate a set of new
problems
min /max qi
s.t. yi + q1 + q2 − 1 = 0, i = 1, 2
Li ≤ qi ≤ Ui, i = 1, 2
yi ≥ Aki , i = 1, 2 and all k
yi ≤ Bki , i = 1, 2 and all k
(LN-bd)
where Aki s and B
k
i s are defined in Problem (LN).
By Proposition 3.4.4, all the equilibria in (PES-bd) represented by Q(p) ∩ R
are contained in the feasible domain of (LN). Since (LN) and (LN-bd) share the
same constraints, Q(p) ∩ R is also contained in the feasible domain of (LN-bd).
Therefore, maximizing/minimizing the decision variable qi results in a stricter
feasible region for qi that contains Q(p) ∩ R, as well as a smaller region R′. By
using R′ as the new region in (LN), we can again easily solve it and derive ρR′(p).
If ρR
′
(p) is strictly higher than ρR(p), then it is a tighter lower bound for πR(p).
By following this procedure recursively, we could derive an increasingly tighter
bound for πR(p). The detailed algorithm is described in the following.
Algorithm 5. Find a lower bound ρR(p) for πR(p). Input price p = (p1, p2) and
the initial region R0 = [Li, Ui]2. Set R = R0 and starting from ρR(p) = 0
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1. Test the feasibility of Problem (LN). If (LN) is feasible, go to step 2; if (LN)
is infeasible, end the algorithm.
2. Solve Problem (LN). If the objective value at optimum is strictly higher than
π, save it as the new π.
3. Solve Problem (LN-bd) for the new bounds of qi, and save it as R′. If R′
and R are equivalent, end the algorithm; otherwise, update R with R′ and
go back to Step 1.
Output ρR(p).
3.5 Comparison Between One and Two-product
Cases
In this section, we study how the number of products available on the market
impacts the revenue performance. In particular, we compare the one-product case
with the two-product case. First, we consider the (BC) problems and compare
their revenues in the two scenarios. We have the following proposition.
Proposition 3.5.1. Let πm denote the optimistic optimal revenue for the
m-product problem, then limα→∞ πm+1 − π1 = 0.
Proposition 3.5.1 implies that when the network effect is strong, the revenue
from offering just one product is almost as high as that from selling an assortment
of multiple products. This is because the sales quantity of the second product goes
to zero when α is infinitely large.
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Next we consider the pessimistic case. Define the pessimistic optimal pricing
decisions as p, the worst-case sales in equilibrium as q, and the corresponding
total revenue as π2 = p
T · q. If the supremum does not exist in Problem (WC),
then we must interpret p and q in a limiting sense similar to part 2 of Lemma
3.3.4. In comparison, the equilibrium condition (3.6) in the one-product case can
also be transformed into f(q|p) = 0. We define the optimal price, the resulting
sales, and the total revenue in the pessimistic scenario as p, q and π1, then they
have the following property.
Lemma 3.5.2. 1) For any ǫ > 0, if p = α− log ǫ, then q ∈ [0, ǫ) is a necessary
condition for f(q|p) > 0.
2) For any p′ < pL, if the price in one-product case is set to p1 = p′ and the
price in the two-product case is set to pǫ = (p′, α− log ǫ), and the pessimistic
revenues from these two cases are π1(p
′) and π2(pǫ) respectively, then we
have
lim
ǫ→0
‖π1(p′)− π2(pǫ)‖ = 0. (3.12)
3) For the optimal pessimistic revenue π1 in one-product case and the optimal
pessimistic revenue π2 in two-product case, they follow
π1 ≤ π2 (3.13)
The first part of Lemma 3.5.2 says that if the price is high enough, the function
f(q|p) will be almost overlapping the vertical axis. Due to the fact that q has to
satisfy both equations in (3.10), it implies that when p2 is set at a high value,
the condition q1 = f(q2|p2) is almost equivalent to q2 = 0. Therefore, the
condition q2 = f(q1|p1) is almost equivalent to f(q1|p1) = 0, which is exactly the
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equilibrium condition in the one-product case. The second part of Lemma 3.5.2
further exploits this result: for the two-product problem, we can always find a
pair of prices such that the resulting pessimistic revenue is close to the pessimistic
revenue π1 in the one-product case. In other words, it shows that the optimal
price p and the resulting sales quantity q in the one-product case can always be
approximately achieved by setting p1 = p and p2 = L in the two-product case,
where L is a very large number. It also gives us the result that π1 ≤ π2.
In Table 3.2, we compare the optimal revenues between n = 1 and n = 2 for
various α. Naturally, a two-product portfolio always brings higher revenue than a
single-product case. In addition, we also compare the pessimistic price p1 in the
n = 1 case, and the lower price pL2 of the pessimistic optimal prices in n = 2 case.
It is shown that ulp1 is always higher than p
L
2 . However, the difference in revenue
as well as between optimal prices shrinks and when α ≥ 5, there is almost no
difference between them. Therefore, Table 3.2 shows us that when the network
effect is strong, the revenue from offering exactly one product is almost equivalent
to that from selling a portfolio of multiple products. This result suggests that a
company selling products with high network effects may be wise to offer just one
product.
3.6 Numerical Study
In this section, we conduct some numerical experiments to understand more about
the worst-case problem. In particular, we demonstrate that under the two different
perspectives — optimistic or pessimistic — the optimal pricing decisions as well as
the resulting revenues could be drastically different. In addition, their difference
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α 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5 6
π1 0.8769 1.1456 1.4510 1.7840 2.0930 2.3128 2.4811
π2 0.8881 1.1494 1.4523 1.7844 2.0931 2.3128 2.4811
π2−π1
π1
1.276% 0.334% 0.092% 0.023% < 0.001% < 0.001% < 0.001%
p1 1.2493 1.5072 1.8124 2.1492 2.3444 2.4727 2.5849
pL2 1.240 1.501 1.810 2.148 2.343 2.472 2.584
pL
2
−p1
p1
0.74% 0.42% 0.13% 0.06% 0.06% 0.03% 0.03%
Table 3.2: Revenue comparision between n = 1 and n = 2 for different α.
becomes more obvious when the network effect becomes stronger. In the following,
we study a two-product example. We fix the intrinsic values y to be 0. The
network effect parameter α is taken in the range of [3, 5.5], at an increasing rate
of 0.1 in each step. Problem (BC) is solved to derive p(α) and it can be computed
by using the algorithm in Du et al. (2016), but Problem (WC) is more complicated
and the detailed procedure is as follows:
1. Given any α, set the bounds for prices p1 ∈ [0, 30] and p2 ∈ [0, 30], then
construct a grid collection {pti : t = 1, . . . , Ti} at the precision 0.001.
2. For each grid point p = (p1, p2), apply Algorithm 4 on equations (3.10) to
derive all the equilibria and store them in Q(p). If there is more than one
equilibrium, evaluate their revenues and choose the equilibrium q(p) with
the lowest revenue π(p).
3. Compare π(p) for all the grid points and find the price grid point with the
highest value.
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The results of this numerical experiment are summarized in Figure 3.5. Figure
3.5(a) illustrates how p(α) and p(α) change with α. We notice that even though
the two products have same parameters, their prices at optimality are asymmetric.
When the network effect is weak α < 4.5, the optimal pricing decisions under the
two different scenarios are exactly the same and so are the optimal revenues.
However, it no longer holds when α > 4.5. The lower price p1 at optimality in
the pessimistic case, is smaller than the lower optimal price p1 in the optimistic
case. Meanwhile, the higher optimal price p2 in the pessimistic case is larger
than p2. Furthermore, as α increase, p2 grows rapidly close to 30, which is the
upper-bound limit imposed in the test. We believe the “jagged” appearance in p2
in Figure 3.5(b) arises from discretization.
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Figure 3.5: Comparison of pessimistic and optimistic cases
The behavior of p and p can be explained by investigating the equilibrium
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equations (3.10) for different α. In Figure 3.6, we plot the equilibrium equations
at the optimal prices in these four different scenarios: (a) Pessimistic case with
α = 3.5; (b) Optimistic case with α = 3.5; (c) Pessimistic case with α = 5.5;
(d) Optimistic case with α = 5.5. By comparing Figure 3.6(a) and 3.6(b), we
find that when α is relatively small, equilibrium equations (3.10) at the optimistic
pricing decisions has only one solution. In this situation, it is easy to see that the
optimal solutions in the pessimistic case are equal to that in the optimistic case.
In contrast, when α is large, equilibrium equations (3.10) at the optimistic pricing
decisions have multiple solutions. In Figure 3.6(c) and 3.6(d), the dashed line for
the plot of q1 = f(q2) is very close (also indistinguishable) to the horizontal axis
because p2 is very high. In Figure 3.6(c), at p = (2.885, 7.890), there are three
different equilibria qa = (7.97, 0.034), qb = (59.32, 0.015) and qc = (86.96, 0.005).
The highest revenue is πc = 2.5092, in comparison with the lowest revenue πa =
0.2324. These two numbers show that implementing the optimistic optimal prices
would put the seller at the risk of losing 90.73% of his revenue, if the actual sales
is the pessimistic one. In contrast, Figure 3.6(d) shows that when implementing
the pessimistic optimal prices p = (2.472, 29.912), there is only one equilibrium
at q = (93.56, 0.00). The dashed curve “squeezes” just between the solid curve
and the horizontal axis near q1 = 2.3. So there is no equilibrium there and
implementing the only pessimistic prices could secure the seller a revenue of 2.313.
Therefore, there is a high incentive for the seller to implement the pessimistic
optimal price.
As shown in Figure 3.6(c), lower-left equilibrium qa is always unappealing
because it results in a low revenue. To avoid this situation, p1 tends to have
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a lower value such that the local minimum point of q2 = f(q1) is above the
x-axis. At the same time, p2 tends to have a higher value to ensure that q1 =
f(q2) has no equilibrium at the lower-left region. These two effects lead to the
observation that in Figure 3.6(d) there is only one equilibrium. In fact, throughout
all our experiments, we find that implementing the optimal prices of Problem
(WC) always leads to a unique equilibrium. Unfortunately, we are not able to
prove this property.
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(c) Optimistic case α = 5.5
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Figure 3.6: Equilibrium equations at optimality
In addition to compare the optimal decisions and their revenues directly in the
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two scenarios, we are also interested in how an optimal decision in a preassumed
perspective would behave in the other one. Namely, we would like to understand
π(p) and π(p) and the results are shown in Figure 3.7. As we have mentioned,
in our numerical experiments, there is always only one equilibrium at optimality
in the pessimistic case. Therefore, it is not surprising to see that the two revenue
outcomes perfectly match in Figure 3.7(a) when implementing the pessimistic
optimal prices p. In contrast, Figure 3.7(b) shows us that implementing the
optimistic optimal prices p could lead to a huge loss of revenue if the pessimistic
outcome happens. To make things worse, the resulting revenue drops rapidly
when α increases. Therefore, for a seller with a strong risk-averse attitude, the
pessimistic optimal pricing decision is a safer choice that brings in a more secured
amount of revenue.
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Figure 3.7: Comparison of two revenue outcomes
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3.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we employ a robust optimization perspective to study the pricing
optimization problem with network effects. The focus is to resolve the issue
of multiple equilibria at optimal prices and study the optimal pricing problem
from a pessimistic perspective. When there is only one product to sell, we
find a close relationship between the best-case problem and worst-case problem.
Moreover, the worst-case problem can be solved by adding an extra constraint to
the best-case problem. When the firm has two products to sell, we propose two
different methods for computing the pessimistic solution: divide and search, and
linear relaxation. Numerical studies imply that at the pessimistic optimal prices
there is always only one equilibrium for sales quantities. To put the preceding
statement on more rigorous ground, we need to determine whether the supremum
in (WC) is a maximum for the case when n = 2. Other results in the numerical
studies show that the potential loss of revenue from using the optimistic optimal
prices could be huge, compared with using the pessimistic optimal prices.
Chapter 4
Future Research Directions
In this chapter, we briefly discuss a number of future research directions based on
the topic of the multinomial logit choice model with network effects.
4.1 Joint Assortment Planning and Pricing
Optimization
One important topic in revenue management is assortment planning. Many
companies face the problem of choosing the “right” products for the market among
many potential products. There is often a limit on the number of products that can
be contained in the assortment. The constraint on the assortment capacity could
be due to reasons like budget, marketing strategies, production cost, etc. In Wang
(2012), the author discusses the joint assortment planning and pricing problem
under the standard MNL model. Here we are interested in how network effects
would influence assortment planning and pricing decisions. In this scenario, the
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seller will make two decisions with the goal of maximizing the revenue: 1) Choose
an assortment from the potential products; 2) Set prices for the products in the
chosen assortment.
To model this scenario, we use the same setting as in Section 2.2 with one
extra restriction: the seller can only choose an assortment S with at most C
products from the product set N = {1, . . . , n}. Given an assortment S ⊆ N , the
relationships of utilities, purchase probabilities and prices still follow (2.1) – (2.4),
with product set N replaced by S. In the joint assortment planning and pricing
problem, we have S and qS = (qS1 , . . . , qSn ) as the decision variables and the total
revenue is
π(S, qS) =
∑
j∈S
αj
γj
q2j +
∑
j∈S
qj
γj
log
(
1−
∑
j∈S
qj
)
+
∑
j∈S
qj
γj
(yj − log qj) . (4.1)
The seller’s joint assortment planning and pricing problem can now be
formulated as the following optimization problem:
max π(S, qS)
s.t. |S| ≤ C,∑
j∈S
qj ≤ 1, qi ≥ 0, i ∈ S,
where |S| denotes the cardinality of set S.
There are many papers discussing assortment optimization problems under
variants of MNL models. In the pioneering work of Talluri and van Ryzin (2004),
the authors study assortment problems under MNL without any constraints and
show that the optimal assortment is always a revenue-ordered assortment, which
consists of products in decreasing price order. Wang and Wang (2016) consider
the same problem under the network MNL model: They find that the problem is
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generally NP-Hard, but a new class of assortments called quasi-revenue-ordered
assortments is optimal under some mild conditions. Adding constraints in
the assortment problems (e.g., on the size of the assortment) often makes the
problems more challenging. Davis et al. (2013) show that a class of problems with
certain types of constraints on the assortment can be reformulated and solved as
linear programming problems. Gallego and Topaloglu (2014) study assortment
optimization problems under the nested logit model, with constraints on the set
of products offered in each nest. They also solve joint assortment optimization
and pricing problems under the nested logit model.
Back to our problem, the first goal is to find an efficient algorithm to identify
the optimal assortment S∗, and the optimal price for each product. Another
interesting question arises from comparing the optimal assortment of the above
problem with the original problem. From the discussion in Section 2.4, we know
that in the case of no capacity constraint the optimal solution could be to boost
the sales of a single product. One natural question is, when we limit the size
of assortment, does the optimal assortment always include this product? In the
extreme case, if we only allow 1 product in the assortment, is it optimal to choose
that product which is boosted in the unconstrained setting? This remains an
interesting question to be answered.
4.2 Nested Logit Model with Network Effects
In order to address the IIA property of the standard MNL model, McFadden
(1978, 1980) proposed a model with a nested choice structure, namely, the nested
logit (NL) model. The nested logit model is derived from the idea that consumers
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often make choices in a hierarchical way: a potential buyer first chooses a group of
products among several possible groups, and then limits her subsequent selection
within the chosen group. In recent years, pricing optimization problem under
the NL model has been an area of active research. Li and Huh (2011) study
the pricing problem for a profit-maximizing monopoly and show that the total
profit function is concave in the market shares. In addition, they consider an
oligopoly price-competition setting where each firm owns one nest of products.
By solving for the price equilibrium, they find that competition drives up the
total market share and drives down the prices, but the revenue for a particular
product may go in either way, depending on the product-specific parameters.
Gallego and Wang (2014) study the multi-product pricing problem under the
NL model. They define the “adjusted markup” for each product as its price
minus the sum of its cost and the reciprocal of its price sensitivity, and show
that at optimality adjusted markup is constant for all products within a nest.
They further show that each nest has an adjusted nest-level markup that is nest
invariant. This property of optimal solution helps reduce the problem to a single
variable optimization over a bounded interval. In Li et al. (2015), the authors
provide an efficient algorithm to find the optimal assortment under a d-level nested
logit model. They also study the price optimization problem with the assortment
fixed, and develop a price-converging algorithm that performs much faster than
gradient-based methods in their numerical experiments.
To our knowledge, no one has considered the NL model with network effects,
and we want to investigate how network effects would influence the sellers’
decisions in this framework. To describe the model more clearly, we start
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with a two-stage nested logit model but the idea can be extended to multiple
stages. Suppose all the products can be categorized into n nests, and in nest
i ∈ N = {1, . . . , n} there are mi products. A customer will first choose a nest,
then choose within that nest. The utility from choosing product j in nest i is
uij = vij + ǫij = yij − pij + αijxij + βi
mi∑
k=1
xik + ǫij . (4.2)
Here yij is the intrinsic utility of that product, pij is the product price (for
simplicity, we assume all the customers are equally sensitive to prices and
normalize the price sensitivity to 1). We use parameter αij to represent the
strength of networks for product ij and xij to denote the overall consumption
of product ij. A customer gains more utility from purchasing product ij if more
other customers purchase product ij. All the above interpretations are the same as
in the standard MNL with networks effects. A main difference of using the nested
logit model comes from the term βi
∑mi
k=1 xik, where βi can be interpreted as the
strength of network effects for nest i and
∑mi
k=1 xik is the aggregate consumption
of all the products in nest i. Therefore βi
∑mi
k=1 xik is the extra utility from the
influence of aggregate consumption in nest i.
In the nested logit model, we use qj|i to denote the probability that a customer
purchases product j given he has chosen category i, and Qi to denote the
probability for a customer to choose category i. Then we have
qj|i =
exp(vij)∑mi
k=1 exp(vik)
, Qi =
ηγii
1 +
∑n
l=1 η
γl
l
,
where ηi =
∑mi
j=1 exp(vij). The γl’s are called nest dissimilarity indices of product
categories and represent the degree of inter-nest heterogeneity. Here we assume
0 < γl < 1, which means products are more similar within nest i than across
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nests.
Then the probability of choosing product j in nest i is qij = Qiqj|i and the
profit generated from that product is
πij = (pij − cij)qij . (4.3)
To explain the reasoning behind the model, we can take the mobile games
industry as an example. Mobile games can be grouped into different categories
such as strategy, adventures, actions, etc. Customers have their own preferences
over the categories, and when they are choosing among the wide variety of games,
they first decide one category and then select one particular game within that
category. To validate the term βi
∑mi
k=1 xik in the utility function, think about this
scenario. Suppose one game gains popularity in a short time. On one hand, it
benefits the original game buyers because more players means more interaction in
the gameplay; on the other hand, this game’s rising fame would attract attention
of customers who have no prior interest in this game category, and there is a
chance that they choose other products other than the popular one. Therefore,
extra consumption of one product benefits the players of all games in the same
category.
Unlike in the standard model where all products are sold by one seller, here we
do not specify whether one monopoly firm sells all the products or multiple firms
sell their own exclusive products. One possible situation is that there are n firms,
and each firm focuses on one category and sells products within that category.
Therefore the firms compete over nests but monopolize within their own nests.
The video game industry falls into this setting, because most game developers
have their expertise and strength in one category of games and put all of their
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efforts into that category. Another possible situation is that there are multiple
firms selling exclusive products across different nests, and they not only compete
over different nests but also compete within the nests. The cloud storage service
is a suitable example for this setting. Dropbox and Box.com both provide cloud
storage service for differentiated space. Light users may find the free space suffices
for their demands, while enterprise users need to pay much more for storing their
massive data. Then cloud storage service can be grouped by their tiered storage
capacity and the two companies compete with each other in each market segment.
The decision makers can take advantage of the nested logit model with network
effects for their flexible purpose. In the product planning stage, they can use this
model to evaluate which nest is best for a new product. In the product developing
stage, they can use the model to design the product with appropriate features.
In the selling stage, prices are the decision variables to help them maximize the
revenue.
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Appendix
Uniqueness and Stability of Optimal Sales Levels
In our developments, we have used q as the decision variable in the seller’s
revenue optimization problem. However, as mentioned in Section 2.2, given a
price vector p, there could be multiple q that satisfy the equilibrium condition
(2.4), which we write here as q = F (p, q) to show the dependence upon p.
We effectively assumed that the seller can select sales quantities q by using
prices p(q) = (p1(q), . . . , pn(q)) given by (2.5). In this section, we provide some
justification for this assumption.
Observe first that for any (p, q) pair that satisfies q = F (p, q), it must be
that p = p(q) because as noted in Section 2.2, given a q, there is a unique p
for which q = F (p, q). Consequently, if a (p, q) pair satisfies q = F (p, q), then∑
j qjpj =
∑
j qjpj(q) ≤
∑
j q
∗
jpj(q
∗) =
∑
j q
∗
j p
∗
j . That is, if a (p, q) pair is an
equilibrium, then the revenue accrued at that equilibrium is no greater than that
accrued at the equilibrium sales quantities and prices identified in Theorems 2.3.1
and 2.3.2.
The seller will implement prices p∗ = p(q∗), so it is of particular interest to
look at the possibility that for the optimal q∗, there could be some other q′ that
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also satisfies the equilibrium condition for p∗ = p(q∗), i.e., q′ = F (p∗, q′). By
the preceding argument, we see that the revenue associated with (q′,p∗) cannot
exceed that of (q∗,p∗). Hence, if there are multiple equilibria associated with
prices p(q∗), then we may view the seller as picking the best one that can arise
from those prices.
Proposition 4.2.1 below provides a sufficient condition that ensures that for
each p, there exists a unique q that satisfies (2.4), i.e., that satisfies q = F (p, q).
Consequently, for problems that satisfy the sufficient condition, if the seller
implements prices p(q∗), then the only sales levels that satisfy (2.4) are q∗ and
hence the issue of multiple equilibria is not present. The proposition is proved in
Miyao and Shapiro (1981) for a model more general than ours and is specialized
to the network choice model (2.4) in Wang and Wang (2016).
Proposition 4.2.1. For any values of {(αi, γi, yi) : i ∈ N} and any p, there
exists at least one solution to (2.4). Moreover, if αi ≤ 2 for all i ∈ N , then for
any {(γi, yi) : i ∈ N} and any p, the solution to (2.4) is unique.
One important question about the choice model we consider is whether sales
levels q will converge to an equilibrium if they are initially out of equilibrium
and customers repeatedly adjust their purchase decisions according to market
conditions. To address this, we consider the following dynamics of the sales
quantities:
qti =
exp(yi − γipi + αiqt−1i )
1 +
∑n
j=1 exp(yj − γjpj + αjqt−1j )
. (4.4)
The following result is proved in Miyao and Shapiro (1981) and Wang and Wang
(2016):
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Proposition 4.2.2. Suppose |αi| ≤ 2 for all i ∈ N . Fix any p and any q0 =
(q01, . . . , q
0
n) and consider {qt = (qt1, . . . , qtn)} in (4.4). Then {qt} converges to the
unique solution to (2.4).
In Wang and Wang (2016), the authors use a set of DVD purchase data from
a major online retailer to calibrate the network MNL choice model, and find the
optimal fit of the coefficient α (they assume homogeneous αi across products)
is 0.998 (statistically significant). Therefore, in that case, the conditions in
Propositions 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 hold, the equilibrium is unique for any prices, and
dynamic customer adjustments will give us convergence to that equilibrium.
In general, if the αi do not satisfy the conditions in the above propositions, then
it is possible that there are multiple equilibria for (2.4) and the above dynamic
adjustments (4.4) may converge to different equilibria depending on the starting
point (see Section 2.6.1 for further discussion). In fact, such phenomenon of
multiple equilibria is quite common in models that incorporate network effects;
see, for example, Galeotti et al. (2010), Jackson and Yariv (2007), Sundararajan
(2007), Economides (1996b), Katz and Shapiro (1985), Dybvig and Spatt (1983),
and Rohlfs (1974), among many others. There is evidently not a single “right”
answer to the question of what will happen in the presence of multiple equilibria.
However, one notion that has been used to explain why a particular equilibrium
might arise while another might not is that of (local) stability.
We will argue next that q∗ is a stable equilibrium under prices p(q∗). For the
ensuing discussion we say that q∗ is a stable equilibrium if all the eigenvalues of the
Jacobian matrix of F (q) at q∗ have real part less than 1 (see Chapter 4 in Merkin
1997 for a reference). Such stability ensures that there exists a neighborhood of q∗
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such that the differential equation system ∂q(t)
∂t
= F (q(t))−q(t) with starting point
q(0) in a neighborhood of q∗ will converge to q∗ as t goes to infinity. In practice,
the seller may first guide the customers to a neighborhood of q∗ (e.g., by posting
expected sales) and then the dynamics of the system will make the sales levels
converge to q∗, thereby justifying the choice of q∗. Related notions of equilibrium
stability are discussed in, e.g., Jackson and Yariv (2007) and Economides (1996b).
Proposition 4.2.3. Consider the homogeneous case with αi = α ≤ αˆ (αˆ is defined
in Theorem 2.3.1), γi = 1, and yi = y for all i ∈ N . The optimal q∗ is a stable
equilibrium.
Proof. Consider the Jacobian matrix J = ∂F
∂q
. We have
∂Fi
∂qi
=
αiBi(1 +
∑n
k=1Bk)− αiB2i
(1 +
∑n
k=1Bk)
2
= αiqi(1− qi),
∂Fi
∂qj
=
−αjBiBj
(1 +
∑n
k=1Bk)
2
= −αjqiqj , i 6= j.
where Bi = exp(yi − γipi + αiqi). When αi = α ≤ αˆ, γi = 1, and yi = y, the
Jacobian matrix J can be written as:
J =
[
∂Fi
∂qj
]
(i,j)
= α

q1(1− q1) −q1q2 · · · −q1qn
−q1q2 q2(1− q2) −q2qn
...
. . .
...
−q1qn −q2qn · · · qn(1− qn)

.
By Theorem 2.3.1(a), q∗1 = · · · = q∗n = q∗ when α ≤ αˆ. In this case, J =
αq∗[I − q∗eeT ], where I is an identity matrix. The largest eigenvalue of J is
αq∗. To see this, note that the eigenvalues of eeT are 0, . . . , 0, n and therefore
the eigenvalues of [I − q∗eeT ] are 1, . . . , 1, 1 − nq∗ and the eigenvalues of J are
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αq∗, . . . , αq∗, αq∗(1 − nq∗). By Lemma 4.2.4, we have ∂2π˜
∂s2i
(s∗) = 2α − 1
q∗
≤ 0 in
this case. Thus we have proved that q∗ must be a stable fixed point when α ≤ αˆ.

Unfortunately, we have not been able to prove the stability of the optimal q∗
in the general case. However, we have conducted a large number of numerical
experiments (with both homogeneous and heterogeneous parameters) and in all
experiments, the optimal q∗ is stable.
Proofs for Section 2.3
To prove the theorems and propositions in Section 2.3, we need the following
lemma.
Lemma 4.2.4. For any optimal solution sˆ to (P2), we must have ∂π˜
∂si
(sˆ) = 0 and
∂2π˜
∂s2i
(sˆ) ≤ 0 for all i ∈ N . Similarly, for any optimal solution qˆ to (P1), we must
have ∂π
∂qi
(qˆ) = 0 and ∂
2π
∂q2i
(qˆ) ≤ 0 for all i ∈ N .
Proof. Consider (P0) with homogeneous parameters. If we substitute for q in
terms of s, then we get a problem (P0′) that is the same as (P2) except the feasible
region is {s|1/√n ≥ s1 ≥ 0, qi ≥ 0} where the qi are given by (2.13). Next we
show that any optimal solution s˜ to (P0′) must be an interior point in the feasible
region. For this, it suffices to show that 0 < s˜1 < 1/
√
n and q˜i > 0. The KKT
condition for s1 at optimality is
2αs1 +
√
n
(
y + log(1−√ns1)
)− √n
1− s1
√
n
− 1√
n
n∑
j=1
log qj + ν1 −
n∑
j=1
λj
1√
n
= 0,
where ν1 and λj are Lagrange multipliers satisfying ν1 ≥ 0, λj ≥ 0. From the
KKT condition, it can be seen that at optimality, we must have s1 < 1/
√
n and
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qi > 0 for all i ∈ N . It then follows that s1 > 0 by (2.12). Thus, any optimal s˜
must be in the interior, and therefore ∂π˜
∂si
(s˜) = 0 and ∂
2π˜
∂s2i
(s˜) ≤ 0 must hold for
any such s˜. Recall that sˆ is an optimal solution to (P2), and A−1sˆ is an optimal
solution to (P1). Thus A−1sˆ is also optimal for (P0). It follows that sˆ is also
optimal to (P0′). Therefore, we must have ∂π˜
∂si
(sˆ) = 0 and ∂
2π˜
∂s2i
(sˆ) ≤ 0. The second
half of the lemma follows immediately, because ∂π
∂q
= A∂π˜
∂s
and ∂
2π
∂q2
= AT ∂
2π˜
∂s2
A.
We are now ready to prove Propositions 2.3.3 and 2.3.4.
Proof of Proposition 2.3.3. By Lemma 4.2.4, we must have ∂π
∂qi
(q∗) = 0, thus
(2.11) follows. Note that 2αx− log x is strictly convex in x, and hence for any σ,
2αq − log q = C(σ) has at most two different solutions. Therefore q∗ has at most
two distinct entries.
Proof of Proposition 2.3.4. To prove that π˜(s1, . . . , sn) is supermodular in
(s, α), it suffices to show that all the cross partial derivatives are non-negative.
We have
∂2π˜
∂α∂si
= 2si for all i
∂2π˜
∂si∂sj
=

1√
nj(j−1)
∑j−1
k=1(
1
qj
− 1
qk
), j > i = 1
1√
ij(i−1)(j−1)
∑i−1
k=1(
1
qi
− 1
qk
), j > i ≥ 2.
By our assumption, q1 ≥ · · · ≥ qn. Therefore, all the cross partials are
non-negative and π˜(s1, . . . , sn) is supermodular in (s, α).
Next we prove that the feasible set is a sublattice on Rn. This is true because
all the constraints 1/
√
n ≥ s1 ≥
√
n− 1sn, s2 ≥ 0, si+1 ≥
√
(i− 1)/(i+ 1)si are
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bimonotone linear inequalities, i.e., for each inequality there are at most two
non-zero coefficients that are of opposite signs. The rest of the lemma follows
directly from Theorem 2.8.2 of Topkis (1998).
Lemma 4.2.5. If q∗ has two distinct entries qH and qL with d = qH − qL > 0,
then we must have qH = qH(d) and qL = qL(d) where
qH(d) =
de2αd
e2αd − 1 , qL(d) =
d
e2αd − 1 . (4.5)
Moreover, qH(d) is increasing and qL(d) is decreasing in d with qH(d) >
1
2α
> qL(d)
for all d > 0.
Proof. If q∗ has two distinct entries qH , qL with d = qH − qL > 0, then (2.11)
implies that log qH − log qL = 2α(qH − qL). From this we can solve for qH and qL
to obtain (4.5).
Define qH(0) = limd→0 qH(d) = 1/2α and qL(0) = limd→0 qL(d) = 1/2α. First
consider qL(d). We have
q′L(d) =
e2αd − 2αde2αd − 1
(e2αd − 1)2 .
Define x = 2αd and g1(x) = e
x − xex − 1. To prove qL(d) is decreasing, it
suffices to prove g1(x) < 0 on x > 0. The latter condition is indeed true, because
g′1(x) = −xex < 0 and g1(0) = 0. Thus qL(d) is decreasing in d > 0 and qL(d) <
qL(0) = 1/2α.
Similarly, we have
q′H(d) =
e4αd − e2αd − 2αde2αd
(e2αd − 1)2 .
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To show qH(d) is increasing, we again take x = 2αd. It suffices to prove
g2(x) = e
2x − ex − xex > 0 on x > 0. Because ex > 1 + x on x > 0, we
have g2(x) = e
x(ex − 1 − x) > 0. Therefore qH(d) is increasing in d > 0 with
qH(d) > qH(0) = 1/2α.
Proof of Theorem 2.3.1. First we prove that q∗ must be of the form q∗1 ≥ q∗2 =
· · · = q∗n. By Proposition 2.3.3, entries of q∗ can take at most two distinct values.
Because of the constraint q1 ≥ · · · ≥ qn, we can assume
q∗i =

qH i = 1, . . . , k
qL i = k + 1, . . . , n,
where qH > qL for some k (the case q1 = · · · = qn corresponds to k = 0). Next we
will prove k ≤ 1 by contradiction.
If k ≥ 2, we have by (2.12) and (2.14),
∂2π˜
∂s2k
(s∗) = 2α−
n∑
j=1
1
qj
(
∂qj
∂sk
)2
= 2α−
k−1∑
j=1
1
k(k − 1)q∗j
− k − 1
k
1
q∗k
= 2α− 1
qH
.
By Lemma 4.2.5, qH >
1
2α
and thus ∂
2π˜
∂s2i
(s∗) > 0, which contradicts Lemma 4.2.4.
Therefore q∗ must be of the form q∗1 ≥ q∗2 = · · · = q∗n.
Now by Proposition 2.3.4, we know that s∗2 = (q
∗
1 − q∗2)/
√
2 increases in α.
Therefore, there is a threshold αˆ for α below which q∗1 = · · · = q∗n, and above
which q∗1 > q
∗
2 = · · · = q∗n. Furthermore, for the case when q∗1 = · · · = q∗n, by
Proposition 2.3.4 we have that s∗1 =
√
nq∗1 increases in α. Therefore q
∗
i increases
in α for all i ∈ N in this case. Part (a) is thus proved.
When q∗1 > q
∗
2 = · · · = q∗n, by Lemma 4.2.5, qL(d) decreases in d and d =
q∗1 − q∗2 =
√
2s∗2 increases in α by Proposition 2.3.4. Furthermore, with d fixed,
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qL =
d
e2αd−1 decreases in α. Thus q
∗
2 decreases in α. Moreover, by Proposition
2.3.4, s∗1 =
∑n
i=1 q
∗
i /
√
n = (qH + (n− 1)qL)/
√
n increases in α, and hence q∗1 = qH
must increase in α.
As α goes to infinity, we have qL < 1/2α by Lemma 4.2.5. Therefore qi = qL
goes to 0 in the limit for all i ≥ 2. Furthermore, by Lemma 4.2.4, we have
∂π
∂q1
(q∗) = 2αq∗1 + log(1−
√
ns∗1) + y −
1
1−√ns∗1
− log q∗1 = 0,
and thus log(1−√ns∗1)− 11−√ns∗
1
= −2αq∗1 − y+ log q∗1. Now we have proved that
q∗1 increases in α. Thus, −2αq∗1 − y + log q∗1 goes to −∞ as α goes to infinity.
Therefore s∗1 goes to 1/
√
n in the limit, which also means q∗1 goes to 1. Hence,
part (b) is also proved.
Proposition 4.2.6 below completes the proof of the theorem. 
Proposition 4.2.6. Let R(α) = y + log (2α− n) − n
2α−n . There is a unique
solution αR to R(α) = 0. Moreover, 1/2 < αˆ ≤ αR. If n = 2, then αˆ = αR.
Proof. We first prove the uniqueness of αR. First, we note that R(α)→ −∞ as
α ↓ n/2 and R(α)→∞ as α→∞. Moreover, R(α) is continuous and increasing
in α on (n/2,∞), so there is a unique solution αR to R(α) = 0. And we have
R(α) > 0 for α > αR. (4.6)
To show that αˆ > 1/2, observe that when α ≤ 1/2, we must have q∗1 = · · · = q∗n.
Otherwise, Lemma 4.2.5 implies that qH >
1
2α
≥ 1, which is a contradiction.
Hence, αˆ > 1/2.
Next, we will prove that q∗1 > q
∗
2 = · · · = q∗n when α > αR, from which it
follows that αˆ ≤ αR. By the results we have proved, it suffices to rule out the
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possibility q∗1 = · · · = q∗n. In the ensuing argument we shall use the expressions
(4.7)–(4.9) for derivatives of π˜(·), which follow from (2.12)–(2.14):
∂π˜
∂s1
= 2αs1 +
√
n(y + log(1−√ns1))− ns1
1−√ns1 −
n∑
j=1
1√
n
(log qj + 1) (4.7)
∂2π˜
∂s21
= 2α− n
1−√ns1 −
n
(1−√ns1)2 −
n∑
j=1
1
nqj
(4.8)
∂2π˜
∂s2i
= 2α−
i−1∑
j=1
1
(i− 1)iqj −
i− 1
iqi
for i = 2, . . . , n. (4.9)
Consider α > αR and suppose for a contradiction that q∗1 = · · · = q∗n = q∗.
By (2.12) we have that s∗ is given by s∗1 =
√
nq∗ and s∗2 = · · · = s∗n = 0. By
Lemma 4.2.4 and (4.9), we have 0 ≥ ∂2π˜
∂s2i
(s∗) = 2α− 1
q∗
for i = 2, . . . , n. Therefore,
q∗ ≤ 1
2α
.
Next we show q∗ > 1/3n. From (4.7) we obtain
∂π˜
∂s1
(s∗) =
√
n
(
2αq∗ + y + log(1− nq∗)− 1
1− nq∗ − log q
∗
)
=
√
nϕ(q∗),
(4.10)
where we define ϕ(q) = 2αq + y + log(1− nq)− 1
1−nq − log q. Note that αR must
satisfy 2αR− n > 0, and therefore 2α > n because we are considering an α > αR.
Thus
∂π˜
∂s1
(s∗) >
√
n
(
nq∗ + log(1− nq∗)− 1
1− nq∗ − log q
∗
)
=
√
nϕ̂(q∗),
where we define ϕ̂(q) = nq + log(1 − nq) − 1
1−nq − log q. We claim ϕ̂(q) > 0
when q ≤ 1/3n. This is true because ϕ̂(1/3n) = log 2n − 7/6 > 0 and ϕ̂′(q) =
n − 1/q(1 − nq)2 is negative for 0 < q < 1/3n. Therefore, by Lemma 4.2.4, we
must have q∗ > 1/3n.
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Consider now the second derivative of π˜ with respect to s1 evaluated at s
∗.
By (4.8) and Lemma 4.2.4 we have
0 ≥ ∂
2π˜
∂s21
(s∗) = 2α− 1
q∗(1− nq∗)2 = ψ(q
∗),
where we define ψ(q) = 2α− 1
q(1−nq)2 . It is easy to verify that ψ(q) decreases in q
for q ≥ 1/3n, thus ψ(q) ≤ 0 for all q ∈ [q∗, 1
2α
]. Note also that ψ(q) = ϕ′(q), and
hence ϕ′(q) ≤ 0 for all q ∈ [q∗, 1
2α
]. It follows immediately that ϕ(q∗) ≥ ϕ(1/2α).
Therefore,
√
nϕ(q∗) ≥ √nϕ(1/2α) = √n
(
y + log(2α− n)− n
2α− n
)
=
√
nR(α) > 0,
where the final inequality follows from (4.6). Combining the preceding with (4.10),
we see that ∂π˜
∂s1
(s∗) > 0, which is a contradiction with Lemma 4.2.4. Thus we have
proved that q∗1 > q
∗
2 = · · · = q∗n for α > αR. Hence, αˆ ≤ αR.
To complete the proof it remains only to establish that αˆ = αR when n = 2.
We just proved that αˆ ≤ αR for any n. Hence, it suffices to show that for n = 2,
q∗1 = q
∗
2 at α = α
R.
Suppose n = 2 and α = αR. By (2.12) and (4.7), the first-order condition for
s1 is
∂π˜
∂s1
=
1√
2
(
2αs+ 2y + 2 log 2 + 2 log (1− s)− 2
1− s − log (s+ d)− log (s− d)
)
= 0 (4.11)
where s = q1 + q2 and d = q1 − q2. The feasible region for (P2) is 0 ≤ d ≤ s ≤ 1.
From the definition of αR, we have 2y + 2 log 2 = −2 log(α− 1) + 2
α−1 at α = α
R.
By Proposition 2.3.3, if q∗1 − q∗2 = d > 0, then s = s(d) where s(d) is defined as
s(d) = qH(d) + qL(d) =
d exp(2αd)+d
exp(2αd)−1 . We also let s(0) = limd→0 s(d) = 1/α. With
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this we can re-write the first order condition (4.11) without the leading 1/
√
2 as
f(d) = 0 where
f(d) =2αs(d)− 2 log (α− 1) + 2
α− 1+
2 log (1− s(d))− 2
1− s(d) − log (s(d) + d)− log (s(d)− d).
Note that f(0) = 0. To establish that q∗1 = q
∗
2 , it is sufficient to verify that
f(d) 6= 0 on (0, d¯] where d¯ is such that s(d¯) = 1.
With Lemma 4.2.7 below, we know that f(d) 6= 0 on (0, d¯] and thus the
proposition holds. 
Lemma 4.2.7. f(d) defined in the proof of Proposition 4.2.6 is strictly decreasing
on [0, d¯).
Proof. We first remove the terms that do not depend upon d in f(d) and define
g(d) = 2αs(d) + 2 log (1− s(d))− 2
1− s(d) − log (s(d)
2 − d2).
Now it suffices to prove g(d) decreases on [0, d¯). To do so, we write g(d) =
2g1(d) + g2(d) where
g1(d) = αs(d)− 1
1− s(d) , g2(d) = 2 log (1− s(d))− log (s(d)
2 − d2).
It suffices to prove that both g1(d) and g2(d) are decreasing on [0, d¯).
We first consider g1(d). We have g
′
1(d) = (α−1/(1−s(d))2)s′(d). We claim that
s(d) is increasing on d > 0. To prove this, we define x = exp(2αd). Then s(d) =
s¯(x) = (x+1) log x
2α(x−1) . Differentiating, we get s¯
′(x) = x−1/x−2 log x
2α(x−1)2 . The numerator
x − 1/x − 2 log x is 0 at x = 1; taking the derivative of this expression yields
1+1/x2−2/x = (1−1/x)2. Thus the numerator of s¯′(x) is zero at x = 1 and strictly
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positive for x > 1, and thus the claim is proved. Therefore, s(d) > s(0) = 1/α
when d > 0. For d ∈ (0, d¯) we have 0 < 1− s(d) < 1− 1/α and therefore
g′1(d) < (α− 1/(1− 1/α)2)s′(d) = (α− α2/(α− 1)2)s′(d)
=
αs′(d)
(1− α)2 (α
2 − 3α+ 1).
From the above, g′1(d) < 0 if α
R ∈ (1, 3+
√
5
2
). (Recall we have taken α = αR.) It
is evident that αR > 1 from the definition of R(·). Moreover R(·) increases in y,
so αR < α0 = 2.18 <
3+
√
5
2
where α0 satisfies 0 + log(2α0 − 2) − 1α0−1 = 0 (i.e.,
R(α0) = 0 when y = 0). Hence, g
′
1(d) < 0.
Next we consider g2(d). We have
g2(d) = 2 log (1− s(d))− log (s(d)2 − d2)
= 2 log
(
eαd − e−αd
2d
− e
αd − e−αd
2
)
.
= 2 log h(d).
Therefore, in order to prove that g2(d) is decreasing, it suffices to show that h(d)
is decreasing in d on [0, d¯). We take the derivative, and we have
h′(d) =
1
2d2eαd
{
e2αd(−αd2 + αd− 1) + αd2 + αd+ 1} .
Now we want to show that h′(d) ≤ 0. For this, it suffices to show that the
numerator is less than 0. Denote the numerator by h1(d). We have h1(0) = 0,
and h′1(d) = αe
2αd(−2d − 2αd2 + 2αd − 1) + 2αd + α. Thus h′1(0) = 0. Now
it suffices to show that h′′1(d) ≤ 0 for all d ∈ [0, d¯). Taking another derivative,
we get h′′1(d) = αe
2αd(−2 − 8αd − 4α2d2 + 4α2d) + 2α. We have h′′1(0) = 0 so it
suffices to show that h′′′1 (d) ≤ 0 for all d ∈ [0, d¯). Taking yet another derivative
gives us h′′′1 (d) = αe
2αd(−4α(3− α)− 8α2d(3− α)− 8α3d2). Since 0 < αR ≤ 2.18
when n = 2, h′′′1 (d) < 0. Thus we have proved that g2(d) is decreasing, which
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completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 2.3.2. First we prove part (a). When α ≤ αˆ, we have
q∗1 = · · · = q∗n = q∗ by Theorem 2.3.1. By (2.7), the entries of the optimal price
vector p∗ must also be identical and given by
p(q∗) = αq∗ − log q∗ + log (1− nq∗) + y. (4.12)
Furthermore, with the condition q1 = · · · = qn = q∗ and (2.11), we can see that
q∗ must satisfy
2αq∗ + y + log(1− nq∗)− 1
1− nq∗ − log q
∗ = 0.
Using the above equation to substitute for αq∗ in (4.12), we have
p(q∗) =
1
2
(
1
1− nq∗ + log(1− nq
∗)− log q∗ + y
)
and p′(q∗) =
2nq∗ − 1
2q∗(1− nq∗)2 .
From the preceding expression, it can be seen that the behavior of p(q∗)
depends on the sign of 2nq∗ − 1. When q∗ ≤ 1/2n, p(q∗) decreases in α. When
q∗ ≥ 1/2n, p(q∗) increases in α.
By Theorem 2.3.1, q∗ monotonically increases in α ∈ [0, αˆ]. Thus if q∗ ≥ 1/2n
at α = 0, then p(q∗) increases in α; if q∗ ≤ 1/2n at α = αˆ, then p(q∗) decreases in
α; if q∗ = 1/2n at α ∈ (0, αˆ), then p(q∗) first decreases and then increases in α.
This completes the proof of part (a).
Next we prove part (b). When α > αˆ, we have q∗1 > q
∗
2 = · · · = q∗n by Theorem
2.3.1. Also, by (2.7), we have
p∗1 = αq
∗
1 − log q∗1 + log(1− s∗) + y, p∗2 = αq∗2 − log q∗2 + log(1− s∗) + y,
(4.13)
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where s∗ = q∗1 + (n− 1)q∗2. Thus,
p∗1 − p∗2 = α(q∗1 − q∗2)− (log q∗1 − log q∗2) = −α(q∗1 − q∗2) < 0,
so, p∗1 < p
∗
2 = · · · = p∗n. Similar to part (a), by (2.11), we have
2αq∗1 + log(1− s∗) + y −
1
1− s∗ − log q
∗
1 = 0,
2αq∗2 + log(1− s∗) + y −
1
1− s∗ − log q
∗
2 = 0.
Substituting for αq∗1 and αq
∗
2 in (4.13), we obtain
p∗2 =
1
2
(
1
1− s∗ + log(1− s
∗) + y − log q∗2
)
,
p∗1 =
1
2
(
1
1− s∗ + log(1− s
∗) + y − log q∗1
)
.
It follows that p∗2 increases in α because log q
∗
2 decreases in α by Theorem 2.3.1,
s∗ increases in α by Proposition 2.3.4, and f(s) = 1
1−s + log(1− s) increases in s.
By Theorem 2.3.1, limα→∞ s∗ = limα→∞ q∗1 = 1. Consequently, limα→∞ p
∗
1 = ∞.
Therefore, part (b) is proved.
Proof of Continuity of q∗ in α for n ≤ 2. We prove the n = 1 scenario first.
When n = 1, the problem becomes a one-variable optimization problem. The
objective function is
π(q) = αq2 + q
(
y + log(1− q))− q log(q).
The function π is jointly continuous in q and α. By Corollary A4.8 of Kreps
(2012), to prove the continuity of q∗ in α it is sufficient to establish that for each
α there is a unique q that maximizes π(q).
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For fixed α, observe that π(q) is continuous in q and π′(0) > 0 and π(1) = −∞,
so π(q) has at least one maximizer on (0, 1). Hence, the argument will be complete
if we can show that for fixed α, there is at most one maximizer of π(q). We do
this next by showing that for fixed α, there is at most one local maximizer of π(q).
The first order and the second order derivatives of π are:
π′(q) = 2αq + y + log(1− q)− 1
1− q − log(q), π
′′(q) = 2α− 1
q(1− q)2 .
It is easy to prove that 1
q(1−q)2 achieves its minimum at q = 1/3 and the minimal
value is 27
4
. Therefore if α < 27/8, then π′′(q) < 0 always holds and π(q) is strictly
concave. Thus, there is at most one local maximum when α < 27/8.
We next consider α ≥ 27/8. In that case we have (recall that y ≥ 0)
π′(q) = 2αq+ y+ log(1− q)− 1
1− q − log(q) ≥
27
4
q+ log(1− q)− 1
1− q − log(q).
Let f(q) = 27
4
q + log(1 − q) − 1
1−q − log(q) denote the expression on the right
side of the above inequality. Observe that f(1/3) = 3/4 + log 2 > 0 and f ′(q) =
27
4
− 1
q(1−q)2 ≤ 0 on (0, 1/3]. Hence, f(q) > 0 for q ∈ (0, 1/3]. Therefore, π′(q) > 0
for q ∈ (0, 1/3].
For q ∈ [1/3, 1), recall from above that π′′(q) = 2α − 1
q(1−q)2 . It is easy to
prove that π′′(q) > 0 on [1/3, q′) and π′′(q) < 0 on (q′, 1), where q′ is the unique
solution to 2α = 1
q(1−q)2 on [1/3, 1). Therefore π
′(q) will either first increase and
then decrease, or strictly decrease on [1/3, 1). Combining this with the discussion
for q ∈ (0, 1/3), we see that there is at most one point where π′(q) = 0 on (0, 1).
Therefore there is at most one local maximum.
We have established that for fixed α, there is at most one local maximum of
π(q). Hence, we are done for n = 1.
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Next we consider the n = 2 scenario. By Theorem 2.3.1, we have αˆ = αR. For
α = αˆ, (2.11) implies that q∗ = (q∗, q∗) must satisfy
2αˆq∗ + log(1− 2q∗) + y − 1
1− 2q∗ − log q
∗ = 0. (4.14)
From the definition of αR, we have y = 1/(αˆ − 1) − log(2αˆ − 2). Now we claim
that the unique solution to (4.14) is q∗ = 1/(2αˆ).
First, it is easy to see that 1/(2αˆ) is indeed a solution to (4.14). Next we show
that the left hand side of (4.14) is strictly decreasing in q∗, thus the solution must
be unique. Let l(q) = 2αˆq + log(1− 2q)− 1
1−2q − log q. We have
l′(q) = 2αˆ− 1
q(1− 2q) −
2
(1− 2q)2 < 2αˆ−
1
q(1− 2q) ≤ 2(αˆ− 4)
where the last inequality is because q(1− 2q) ≤ 1/8.
Now it remains to show that αˆ ≤ 4. We note that given y, the function R(α)
is increasing in α, therefore, αˆ is decreasing in y. Furthermore, when y = 0,
R(4) = log 6− 1/3 > 0, therefore, it must hold for all y that αˆ < 4.
Finally, by Lemma 4.2.5, qH(d) =
de2αd
e2αd−1 and qL(d) =
d
e2αd−1 when d > 0. Note
that limd→0 qH(d) = limd→0 qL(d) = 1/(2α), which is the same as q∗ at α = αˆ.
Therefore the continuity is proved.
Proofs for Section 2.4
Proof of Lemma 2.4.1. Consider problem (P0), it is easy to see that at optimal
q
† we must have 1 −∑nj=1 q†j > 0 and q†i > 0 for all i ∈ N . Therefore q† must
satisfy the first-order necessary condition, i.e.,
∂π
∂qi
=
2αqi
γi
+
1
γi
log
(
1−
n∑
j=1
qj
)
−
∑n
j=1 qj/γj
1−∑nj=1 qj + yiγi − 1γi − log qiγi = 0.
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Thus (2.15) follows.
Proof of Lemma 2.4.2. We have h′′α(q) = 1/q
2 > 0. Thus hα(q) is a convex
function and achieves its minimal value hα(q) = 1 + log(2α) at q = 1/2α.
Furthermore, we know that h′α(q) = 2α − 1/q. Therefore hα(q) decreases on
(0, 1/2α) and increases on (1/2α,∞). The lemma is thus proved.
Proof of Proposition 2.4.3. We prove the result by contradiction. Suppose
there exists an optimal solution q′ in which q′i = q
Ci
i , q
′
j = q
Cj
j for some i, j ∈ N .
Consider qǫ where qǫi = q
′
i+ǫ and q
ǫ
j = q
′
j−ǫ, while all the other entries remain the
same as q′. Define ∆(ǫ) = π(qǫ) − π(q′). When ǫ is sufficiently small, qǫ is still
feasible. Because q′ is optimal, ǫ = 0 should be a local maximizer of ∆(ǫ). Thus
ǫ = 0 should satisfy the first- and second-order necessary conditions. Taking the
second-order derivative of ∆(ǫ), we obtain ∆′′(0) = 1
γi
(2αi−1/q′i)+ 1γj (2αj−1/q′j).
Since q′i = q
Ci
i and q
′
j = q
Cj
j , we have q
′
i > 1/2αi and q
′
j > 1/2αj by Lemma 2.4.2.
Hence ∆′′(0) > 0, indicating q′ is not optimal. Thus we reach a contradiction
and the proposition holds.
Proof of Proposition 2.4.4. The objective function (2.17) is symmetric in
(q1, . . . , qn) except for the first term
∑n
j=1 αjq
2
j . Therefore, q
†
1 > · · · > q†n because
α1 > · · · > αn.
Any optimal solution for (P3) must be an interior point, and hence the
first-order optimality conditions are necessary. The first-order conditions are
∂π
∂qi
= 2αiqi − log qi + y + log
(
1−
n∑
j=1
qj
)
− 1
1−∑nj=1 qj = 0 for all i ∈ N
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and hence (2.18) follows.
For part 2, Proposition 2.4.4 part 1 and Lemma 2.4.2 with α = α1 imply
C ≥ 1 + log(2α1). In addition, recall that α1 > · · · > αn. For each i ≥ 2, we
have α1 > αi and hα1(q) > hαi(q) for all q > 0. By part 1, hα1(q
†
1) = hαi(q
†
i ) = C.
Suppose for a contradiction that q†i = q
C
i . Then we have q
†
i > 1/2αi > 1/2α1. By
Proposition 2.4.4 part 1, q†1 ≥ q†i , and because hαi(q) increases on q > 1/2αi, then
hα1(q
†
1) > hαi(q
†
1) ≥ hαi(q†i ) = C which contradicts hα1(q†1) = C. This completes
the proof of part 2.
For part 3, from (2.5), we know that p†i − p†j = αiq†i − αjq†j − (log q†i − log q†j)
for any i 6= j. And from Proposition 2.4.4 part 1, we know that log q†i − log q†j =
2(αiq
†
i −αjq†j). Thus p†i−p†j = αiq†i −αjq†j−2(αiq†i −αjq†j) = −(αiq†i −αjq†j). Since
q†i > q
†
j and αi > αj for i < j, it follows that αiq
†
i > αjq
†
j and therefore p
†
i < p
†
j.
Proof of Proposition 2.4.5. Similarly, (2.20) follows from the first-order
condition. Next we prove q†1 > q
†
2 > · · · > q†n by contradiction. Suppose
q = (q1, q2, . . . , qn) is an optimal solution. In the following, we show that q1 > q2,
the rest will follow from exactly the same argument. We consider another solution
q˜ such that q˜1 = q2, q˜2 = q1, and q˜i = qi for i ≥ 3. Now we consider π(q)− π(q˜),
we have
π(q)− π(q˜) =
(
1
γ1
− 1
γ2
)
×(
α(q21 − q22) + (q1 − q2)
(
y + log
(
1−
n∑
j=1
qj
))
+ q2 log q2 − q1 log q1
)
.
Since q is optimal, π(q)− π(q˜) ≥ 0, and therefore,
α(q21 − q22) + (q1 − q2)
(
y + log
(
1−
n∑
j=1
qj
))
+ q2 log q2 − q1 log q1 ≥ 0.
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Also by (2.20), 2αq1− log q1 < 2αq2− log q2, therefore −q1 log q1 < 2αq1q2−2αq21−
q1 log q2. Thus, we must have
0 ≤ α(q21 − q22) + (q1 − q2)(y + log (1−
n∑
j=1
qj)) + q2 log q2 − q1 log q1
< −α(q1 − q2)2 + (q1 − q2)(y + log (1−
n∑
j=1
qj)) + (q2 − q1) log q2
= (q1 − q2)(−α(q1 − q2) + y + log (1−
n∑
j=1
qi)− log q2).
Again by (2.18), we have
α(q2 − q1) + y + log (1−
n∑
j=1
qj)− log q2
= α(q2 − q1) + 1− 2αq2 +
γ2
∑n
j=1 qj/γj
1−∑nj=1 qj
= −α(q1 + q2) + 1 +
γ2
∑n
j=1 qj/γj
1−∑nj=1 qj
≥ −α(q1 + q2) + 1 + q1 + q2
1−∑nj=1 qj
where the last inequality holds because γ1 < γ2.
Now it is easy to see that when 1 − ∑nj=1 qj ≤ 1/α or α ≤ 1, the right
hand side is positive. Thus q1 > q2. Now it remains to consider the case when
1−∑nj=1 qj > 1/α and α > 1.
In this case, we rewrite the difference π(q)− π(q˜) in the following way:
π(q)− π(q˜) =(
1
γ1
− 1
γ2
)(
αq21 + q1(y + C)− q1 log q1 − (αq22 + q2(y + C)− q2 log q2)
)
where C = log (1−∑nj=1 qj) > − logα. Now define f(x) = αx2+x(y+C)−x log x.
Next we show that f(x) is strictly increasing in x on [0, 1] for any C. If this is
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the case, in order for π(q) ≥ π(q˜), we must have q1 ≥ q2. By (2.20), q1 6= q2.
Consequently, we must have q1 > q2.
To show f(x) is increasing, we have f ′(x) = 2αx+y+C−1− log x. Note that
this function is convex and achieves minimum on [0, 1] at x = 1/2α (remember
in this case, α > 1). The minimum value of f ′(x) is C + log 2α + y ≥ log 2 > 0.
Therefore, f ′(x) > 0 for all x on [0, 1]. And thus the part 1 is proved. Part 2
follows exactly the same as in proof of Proposition 2.4.4 part 2.
